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Abstract: During the last decades, a great many com-
prehensive and thematic instruments for the legal 
protection of human rights have been established. 
Three levels are necessary levels of protection, namely, 
the national, the international, and the supranational 
level. On these levels, however, one finds a plurality 
of bills of rights or other legal instruments for the pro-
tection of human rights respectively, which overlap 
and may conflict. This make the assessment of claims 
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stemming from fundamental rights significantly more 
difficult and gives rise to legal uncertainty. In the first 
part the problem of different levels and layers of legal 
instruments for the protection of human rights will be 
explained and the foundations for an adequate sys-
tem of legal protection of human rights will be laid. 
The second part gives an outline of the development 
of the legal protection of fundamental rights in the 
European Union. Finally, in the third part an analysis 
of the relation between the two layers of fundamental 
rights in the European Union is undertaken against 
the backdrop of the ‘Protocol (No 30) on the Charter of 
the Fundamental Rights of the European Union’. The 
history of this protocol illustrates ‘British exceptional-
ism’ in the field of fundamental rights.
Keywords: human rights, fundamental rights, justi-
ciable rights, European Union, Protocol on the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
Resumo: Durante as últimas décadas, muitos in-
strumentos abrangentes e temáticos para a proteção 
jurídica dos direitos humanos foram estabelecidos. 
São necessários três níveis de proteção, a saber, o 
nível nacional, o internacional e o supranacional. 
Nesses níveis, contudo, encontra-se respectivamente 
uma pluralidade de declarações de direitos ou outros 
instrumentos jurídicos para a proteção de direitos 
humanos que se sobrepõem e podem entrar em con-
flito. Isso torna a avaliação de pretensões baseadas 
em direitos fundamentais significantemente mais 
difícil e gera insegurança jurídica. Na primeira parte 
será explicado o problema dos diferentes níveis e 
camadas de instrumentos jurídicos para a proteção 
de direitos humanos e apresentado o fundamento 
para um sistema de proteção jurídica adequado dos 
direitos humanos. A segunda parte oferece um esboço 
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do desenvolvimento da proteção jurídica de direitos 
fundamentais na União Europeia. Finalmente, na 
terceira parte é realizada uma análise da relação entre 
as duas camadas de direitos fundamentais na União 
Europeia no contexto do “Protocolo (No 30) da Carta 
de Direitos Fundamentais da União Europeia. A his-
tória desse protocolo ilustra o “caráter excepcional da 
Grã-Bretanha” no campo dos direitos fundamentais 
Palavras-chave: direitos humanos, direitos fundamen-
tais, direitos que podem ser arguidos em juízo, União 
Europeia, Protocolo da Carta de Direitos Fundamen-
tais da União Europeia
In this essay the relation between the two layers of 
fundamental rights in the European Union will be in the 
limelight. This relation can be illustrated by analyzing the 
‘Protocol (No 30) on the Charter of the Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union’. The two layers of fundamental 
rights in the European Union are an instance of a greater 
phenomenon, namely, the plurality of legal instruments for 
the protection of human rights. Organs of state, constitutional 
bodies, or national agencies often find themselves under an 
obligation to comply with different layers of fundamental 
rights – for example, a national bill of constitutional rights 
on one hand and an international bill of rights that has been 
incorporated into the national legal system on the other. Two 
different layers of fundamental rights, however, may well 
yield different results with an eye as to whether there is a 
violation of fundamental rights. In such a case, there is often 
no easy answer which of the layers prevails.
In the first part (A.) the general problem of different 
levels and layers of legal instruments for the protection of 
human rights will be explained and some general founda-
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tions for a proper system of legal protection of human rights 
will be laid. The second part (B.) gives an overview of the 
development of the legal protection of fundamental rights 
in the European Union and the third part (C.) is devoted to 
an analysis of the relation between the two layers of funda-
mental rights in the European Union against the backdrop 
of the ‘Protocol (No 30) on the Charter of the Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union’. The history of this protocol 
illustrates ‘British exceptionalism’ in the field of fundamental 
rights. This is an instance of the greater phenomenon of Bri-
tish exceptionalism in general, which ultimately led to ‘Bre-
xit’, the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European 
Union. The analysis of two different layers of fundamental 
rights at the same level of the legal system will illustrate 
that filling gaps in one layer by the other layer counts as a 
virtue of such double structure, while the legal uncertainty 
to which this double structure gives rise must certainly be 
regarded as a vice.
A. Multiple Layers of Legal Instruments for the Pro-
tection of Fundamental Rights
It is a challenging interpretive task to impose order 
on the complex patchwork of legal instruments for the 
protection of human rights and to arrive at a consistent and 
coherent system. In this context, some fundamental insights 
into the nature of human rights and the structure of their 
protection will prove helpful.
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I The Patchwork of Legal Instruments for the 
Protection of Human Rights
The idea of human rights goes back to writings during 
the Enlightenment, most notably the works of Samuel Pu-
fendorf, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel 
Kant. This philosophical idea requires that it be implemented 
into political practice. This began with the Bill of Rights of 
Virginia and the United States Declaration of Independence, 
both stemming from 1776, and the Ten Amendments in 1791 
to the United States Constitution of 1787 on one hand and 
with the French Declaration of the Rights the Man and of the 
Citizen (Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen) of 1789 
on the other. By the middle of the 20th century, nearly every 
constitution of a nation state provided for constitutional 
rights in one form or another, usually in the form of a bill of 
rights. Even constitutions at the state level in federal states 
often record fundamental rights. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), a resolution of the General As-
sembly of the United Nations in 1948,2 marked the beginning 
of the development of legal instruments for the protection 
of fundamental rights in public international law. A great 
many of such legal instruments have been developed since, 
to mention here only the European Convention of Human 
2 GA Res. 217 (III) of 10 December 1948. On the boundless literature on this 
landmark of the protection of human rights see, for example, P. R. Gandhi, 
‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Fifty Years’, German Yearbook 
of International Law 41 (1998), pp. 206-251; Johannes Morsink, The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Jochen von Bernstorff, ‘The 
Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Genesis 
and Symbolic Dimensions of the Turn to Rights in International Law’, 
European Journal of International Law 19 (2008), pp. 903-924. See, on the 
process of drafting, William A. Schabas, The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights – The Travaux Préparatoires (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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Rights (ECHR) of 1950, the American Convention of Human 
Rights (ACHR) of 1969, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both 
stemming from 1966. Along with these rather comprehensive 
instruments, there are thematic instruments such as the Uni-
ted Nations Convention against Torture of 1984 (UNCAT), 
the Council of Europe’s European Convention for the Pre-
vention of Torture or Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 
1987 (CPT) or United Nations Convention of the Rights of 
People with Disabilities (CRPD) of 2006.
Finally, in addition to the national and the international 
level, there is also the supranational level of law (at least in 
Europe). Fundamental rights in the European Union were 
recognized as mere general principles of Union law until 
2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007, the EU’s latest ma-
jor reform treaty, became effective. This reform introduced 
a legally binding bill of rights, the ‘Charter of Fundmantal 
Rights of the European Union’ of 2000, into primary Union 
law (in a slightly amended form).3
Without any doubt, too few legal instruments for the 
protection of human rights are a serious problem. This seems 
to suggest that any additional instrument is welcome. The 
growth of legal instruments for the protection of human 
rights has been, however, a contingent development rather 
than the unfolding of a clear and comprehensive system. At 
some points, historic opportunities presented themselves to 
arrive at either a bill of rights, a comprehensive convention 
or a pact or thematic instrument. These opportunities were 
seized by creating certain instruments, influenced by the 
interpretation of the idea of human rights, which (1) is depen-
3 This will be explained in greater detail in what follows, see, infra, section 
B. II.
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dent on the prevaling morality in different parts of the world 
(cultural relativity) and (2) changes to some extent over time 
(temporal relativity).4 The result is that every state in the 
world is subject to a patchwork of international and national 
instruments for the protection of human rights, in some cases 
complicated further by supranational instruments.
The plurality of legal instruments is complemented by 
a plurality of courts (and other bodies), which lay claim to 
authoritative interpretation of a certain legal instrument. If a 
given case law lays claim to authoritative nature, this implies 
that other courts are bound – at least to a certain extent – by 
this interpretation, even if they disagree on the substantive 
issue of law at stake. For example, the interpretation of an 
international legal instrument by an international court may 
well claim to influence the decision of municipal courts, if 
the constitution of the state in question requires or permits 
such influence. To be sure, in interpreting an international 
legal instrument, an international court has to grant a certain 
extent of discretion to national authorities, which gives rise to 
a margin of appreciation. This is to say that an international 
court has to respect the decision of municipal authorities 
inside the margin of appreciation.5 The problem is, however, 
4 The extent and nature of the phenomenon of cultural relativity of human 
rights depends on which justification for human rights is presupposed. 
This topic goes far beyond the scope of this essay. I shall simply assume 
that there is a certain but limited extent of cultural relativity in the field 
of human rights. See, for example, Jan-Reinard Sieckmann, ‘Cultural 
Pluralism and the Idea of Human Rights’, in: Pluralism and Law, A. Soeteman 
(ed) (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer, 2001), pp. 235-249; James 
Griffin, ‘The Relativity and Ethnocentricity of Human Rights’, in: 
Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, R. Cruft, S. M. Liao, and M. Renzo 
(eds) (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 555-569.
5 On the idea of a margin of appreciation in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, see William A. Schabas, The European Convention 
of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 79-80 with further 
references. This idea was so important for the member states of the Council 
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that the question of the extent of discretion or the weight 
of the authoritative dimension of precedents is unclear and 
contested both in principle and in many given cases.
The plurality of legal instruments, combined with clai-
ms to authoritative interpretation by different courts, gives 
rise to a great deal of legal uncertainty in the interpretation 
of legal instruments for the protection of human rights. This 
is unfortunate for those who are asking themselves bona fides 
what human rights require in a given legal case. What is 
more, it is also unfortunate that this uncertainty can be abu-
sed by those who simply want to evade their human rights 
obligations as much as possible. In short: Legal uncertainty 
resulting from the patchwork of legal instruments for the 
protection of human rights has the potential to significantly 
weaken the protection of human rights.
II Insights into Human Rights and their Legal 
Protection
From the philosophical point of view, human rights 
are moral rights.6 They are – morally – valid by their sheer 
of Europe that they amended the Preamble of the ECHR with ‘Protocol 
No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms‘ of 2013. At the end of the Preamble, an additional 
recital is added: ‘Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure 
the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols 
thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject 
to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights 
established by this Convention’.
6 See, for example, Martin Borowski, ‘Classifying and Qualifying Properties 
of Fundamental Rights’, in: Human Rights and Ethics, A. Ollero (ed) (Stuttgart: 
Steiner, 2007), pp. 37-45, at p. 37. See also Robert Alexy, ‘The Existence of 
Human Rights’, in: Law, Science, and Technology, U. Neumann, K. Günther, 
and L. Schulz (eds) (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013), pp. 9-18, at p. 11: ‘The existence 
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moral correctness, independent from institutionalization 
in national law, international law or any other form of law. 
During the last decades, human rights have come to the fore 
as a yardstick for the legitimacy of laws and whole legal 
systems. In the words of John Tasioulas ‘the discourse of 
human rights’ is the modern ‘ethical lingua franca’.7
This meaning of the expression ‘human right’ is diffe-
rent from a popular parlance in international law, according 
to which it refers to legal instruments, such as in ‘European 
Convention of Human Rights’. This convention is a treaty 
under international law according to Article 38 (1) lit a of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, a legal instru-
ment that has legal validity owing to authoritative issuance 
and social efficay.8 Such a treaty is a legal instrument for the 
protection of human rights, to be distinguished from the 
moral rights themselves that undergird this legal instru-
ment. The rights that such legal instruments record shall be 
termed, in what follows, ‘fundamental rights’ or ‘convention 
rights’, or in the case of being recorded in a constitution, 
‘constitutional rights’.
of human rights consists in their justifiability, and in nothing else’; see, 
furthermore, Robert Alexy, ‘Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human 
Rights’, in: Ratio Juris 25 (2012), pp. 2-14, at p. 10.
7 John Tasioulas, ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’, in: Freedom from 
Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor?, T. Pogge (ed) 
(Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 75-101, at p. 75.
8  On authoritative issuance and social efficacy as critieria for the validity 
o positive law, see Robert Alexy, The Argument from Injustice, trans B. 
Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), 
pp. 85-87.
VIRTUES AND VICES OF TWO LAYERS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 117 | pp. 363-442 | jul./dez. 2018
372
1 The Moral Obligation to Record Human Rights 
in Legal Instruments
For human rights as moral rights per se lack any ins-
titutionalization and, thereby, effective enforceability, they 
require that they be transformed into law. Owing to the 
moral nature of human rights themselves, the obligation of 
transformation into law is a moral obligation.9 This idea is 
reflected by Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which reads: ‘Everyone is entitled to a social and in-
ternational order in which the rights and freedoms set forth 
in this Declaration can be fully realized.’ It gives expression 
to the demand that the presuppositions of effective protec-
tion for the realization of human rights be established in the 
real world.10 This moral obligation is mirrored by the nature 
of legal instruments for the protection of human rights – they 
lay claim to transforming human rights into the law.11
9 See Ernst Tugendhat, Vorlesungen über Ethik (Frankurt on Main: Suhrkamp, 
1993), p. 349; Robert Alexy, ‘Die Institutionalisierung der Menschenrechte 
im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat’, in: Philosophie der Menschenrechte, S. 
Gosepath and G. Lohmann (eds) (Frankfurt on Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), 
p. 255; Martin Borowski, ‘Discourse Theory in International Law – Human 
Rights through Discourse’, in: Ratio Juris 44 (2001), pp. 38-71, at p. 44; 
Borowski, ‘Classifying and Qualifying Properties’ (fn. 5), p. 38; Martin 
Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien, 3rd edn (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018), 
p. 50.
10 See, for example, Thomas Pogge, ‘Menschenrechte als moralische 
Ansprüche an globale Institutionen’, in: Philosophie der Menschenrechte, 
S. Gosepath and G. Lohmann (eds) (Frankfurt on Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), 
pp. 378-400.
11 This implies a weak objective connection between human rights as moral 
rights and legal instruments for their effective protection. A strong 
objective connection – that legal instruments actually are results of the 
transformation of human rights into law proves too strong, a merely 
subjective connection – that the legal instruments were created with the 
subjective intent of transforming human rights into law – is too weak, see 
Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien (fn. 8), pp. 46-49; Borowski, ‘Classifying 
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2 Three Key Arguments for the Transformation 
of Human Rights into Law
There are three key arguments for the transformation 
of human rights into legal rights: (1) the argument from 
effective enforcement, (2) the argument from authoritative 
cognition, and (3) the argument from organization. Human 
rights per se are characterized by their moral nature and 
are not institutionalized. Institutionalization is necessary 
for effective enforcement, ultimately by means of force by 
public authority. Such institutionalization can only be pro-
vided by means of law.12 What is more, there is a great deal 
of uncertainty as to what human rights precisely require in 
a case at hand. Thus, a framework of organs and processes is 
called for, which allocates the legal power for authoritative 
decisions whether human rights are violated in a given case. 
Such a framework is provided, for example, by a constitution 
with a bill of rights, which records human rights in legal 
form with binding force for all branches of government and 
a constitutional court that has final authority in interpreting 
the constitution. These legal powers can only be provided for 
by a legal system.13 Finally, an organization such as the state 
is indispensable for the realization of positive rights such as 
social rights. Social rights redistribute wealth. Tax needs to 
be collected from wealthy citizens and less wealthy citizens 
shall receive social subsidies. This redistribution – taking and 
giving – is a considerably complex undertaking that cannot 
be imagined without an organisation such as the state.14
and Qualifying Properties’ (fn. 5), pp. 39-41.
12 Alexy, ‘Die Institutionalisierung der Menschenrechte’ (fn. 8), pp. 254-255; 
Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien (fn. 8), pp. 50-51.
13 Alexy, ‘Die Institutionalisierung der Menschenrechte’ (fn. 8), p. 256; 
Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien (fn. 8), p. 51.
14  Alexy, ‘Die Institutionalisierung der Menschenrechte’ (fn. 8), pp. 256-
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3 Necessary Levels of Legal Instruments for the 
Protection of Human Rights
On first glance, a single level of legal instruments for 
the protection of human rights seems perfectly sufficient. 
Individuals are subjected to public authority of the state, in 
which they live or currently happen to be. A bill of rights in 
the national constitution and legal power of courts to take 
authoritative decisions on the interpretation of these cons-
titutional rights may well provide effective protection and 
legal certainty. What is more, if the constitution records social 
rights, the redistribution of wealth is organized by that state. 
It is not without reason that legal instruments for the protec-
tion of human rights began to emerge at the national level.
a) The National Level of Legal Instruments for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights
States are still considered as the ultimate source of legal 
power, which rests on popular sovereignty. Sovereignty in 
the sense of unlimited power, stemming from the idea of 
public international law as a means of coordination between 
and among equally sovereign states according the Peace of 
Westphalia from 1648, has more and more been placed in 
perspective by cooperation by means of international orga-
nizations, such as the United Nations. This has not, howe-
ver, changed the idea of sovereignty in the sense of original 
power.15 This is to say that the national level of fundamental 
rights – constitutional rights – is a necessary level for legal 
258; Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien (fn. 8), p. 51.
15 On sovereignty in the sense of original power, see, for example, Neil D. 
MacCormick, ‘Questioning Post-Sovereignty’, European Law Review 29 
(2004), pp. 852-863, at pp. 852-853.
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instruments for the protection of human rights. By contrast, 
fundamental rights at the state level in federal states are, 
strictly speaking, not necessary, if and when all branches 
of government of the state are subject to the constitutional 
rights in the federal constitution.16
b) The International Level of Legal Instruments for the 
Protection of Human Rights
Legal instruments for the protection of human rights 
in international law emerged later. They are an expression 
of the concern for fellow human beings, who live in states 
that generally do not respect human rights in any reasonable 
interpretation or where there are occasional but gross viola-
tions of human rights without sufficient redress by national 
authorities. Human rights treaties are concluded in the form 
characteristic of coordination between and among states, but 
with an eye to their substantive matter these treaties establish 
cooperation – national states are promising each other to treat 
all human beings under their jurisdictions well, supervised 
by treaty organs such as international ‘human rights’ courts. 
A thin layer of jus cogens norms is provided by international 
customary law according to Article 38 (1) lit b of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice.17 Such international legal 
instruments for the protection of human rights are usually 
equipped with less effective enforcement powers, compared 
16 To be sure, this does not mean that constitutional rights in state constitutions 
in federal states are impossible or without any use. The federal constitution 
may leave room for some further concretization of the legal protection of 
human rights at state level, and the result of such concretization may be 
different among states under the same federal constitution.
17 On jus cogens with an eye to human rights, see, for example, James Crawford, 
Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th edn (Oxford University 
Press, 2012), pp. 594-597.
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to national constitutional courts. While a constitutional court 
typically and ideally has the power to declare even parlia-
mentary statutes null and void,18 international courts are 
typically limited to declare a violation of rights. As a matter 
of public international law, the member states are under an 
obligation to observe the judgment,19 this does typically not, 
however, render conflicting national laws or judgments null 
and void. The possibility of just satisfaction – in Europe’s re-
gional systems Article 41 ECHR – has added another aspect 
of the enforcement of decisions, which may be important for 
individuals but is often rather symbolic for states.20
At any rate, the international level of legal instruments 
for the protection of human rights adds a distinct layer of pro-
tection: the protection against one’s own state. A systematic 
and severe violation of human rights of a sovereign state’s 
own population may trigger a humanitarian intervention, 
which may be authorized and performed by an international 
organization or a group of states. The substantive and formal 
requirements for a humanitarian intervention are unclear 
and contested;21 there can be little doubt, however, that in 
18 See, for example, section 78 clause 1 of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court Act.
19 See Article 46 ECHR.
20 On just satisfaction according to Article 41 ECHR, see Schabas, The European 
Convention of Human Rights (fn. 4), pp. 830-840. On the broader provision 
in Article 63 ACHR, see Thomas M. Antkowiak and Alejandra Gonza, The 
American Convention of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 
285-316. 
21 This is a topic in and of itself, which cannot be discussed further here. 
For an overview of the debate, see Richard B. Lillich, ‘Humanitarian 
Intervention through the United Nations: Towards the Development of 
Criteria’, Heidelberg Journal of International Law 53 (1993), pp. 557-575; John 
J. Merriam, ‘Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention’, Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 33 (2001), pp. 111-154; Thomas 
M. Frank, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, in: The Philosophy of International 
Law, S. Besson and John Tasioulas (eds) (Oxford University Press, 2010), 
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modern international public law a humanitarian intervention 
can be justified under certain circumstances. This, in turn, 
awards protection to the individual – not to suffer human 
rights violations by the individual’s home state without the 
prospect of effective legal sanctions – that cannot be produ-
ced by merely national legal instruments for the protection 
of human rights. This is to say that the international level 
of legal instruments for the protection of human rights – 
international fundamental rights – is also a necessary level.
In the context of international fundamental rights two 
aspects are worth mentioning. To begin with, Charles Beitz 
and Joseph Raz have recently characterized human rights by 
focusing solely or strongly on the limit on state sovereignty 
to which they give rise.22 This, if taken literally, can hardly 
be convincing. Of course, the limit on state sovereignty in 
international law is an effect brought about by human ri-
ghts, but it is by no means the only effect worth mentioning. 
The idea that bills of rights in national constitutions record 
human rights only as a means of preventing humanitarian 
interventions by international organizations or other states 
would be a distortion of history. The protection of funda-
mental interests in liberty and equality per se lies at the heart 
of human rights and their legal protection, not relations 
between and among states.
The second aspect is that, compared to constitutional 
rights at the national level, international fundamental rights 
pp. 531-548; Ramesh Thakur, ‘The Use of International Force to Prevent 
or Halt Atrocities: From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility 
to Protect’, in: The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law, 
D. Shelton (ed) (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 815-840.
22 Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2009), 
p. 109 et passim; Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights without Foundations’, in: The 
Philosophy of International Law, S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds) (Oxford 
University Press, 2010), pp. 321-338, at p. 328.
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generally offer less protection. International fundamental 
rights cover the whole world (universal instruments) or a 
continent (regional instruments). For example, there are 47 
member states of the ECHR with a population of roughly 820 
million. It is obvious that the issue of cultural relativity of 
human rights plays a much more significant role within such 
a continent than within a single national state. This has found 
expression in the criterion of a ‘European consensus’, which 
is used in the case law of the European Court of Human Ri-
ghts in Strasbourg in determining the extent of the margin of 
appreciation for the member states – the less consensus, the 
greater the margin of appreciation.23 What is more, there is 
more democratic accountability in the national framework. 
If the general public disagrees with an autoritative interpre-
tation of a certain constitutional right by the constitutional 
court, there are democratic processes available – a political 
debate on this issue can finally lead to an amendment of the 
constitution. Admittedly, an amendment of a constitution 
is usually dependent on qualified majorities in the bodies 
competent for legislation, a referendum or other qualified 
criteria. It is often politically difficult to meet these qualified 
criteria, it is not, however, impossible. By contrast, it is next to 
impossible to amend a substantive provision in a multilateral 
international human rights treaty. If a member state strongly 
disagrees with an authoritative interpretation of a certain 
international fundamental right by an international court, 
an amendment of this international fundamental right can 
hardly be contemplated. There are only two options realis-
tically available for this state: to acquiesce in the decision of 
the international court or withdraw from the human rights 
23 See, most recently, Shai Dothan, ‘Judicial Deference Allows European 
Consensus to Emerge’, Chicago Journal of International Law 18 (2018), pp. 393-
419, at pp. 395-400, with further references.
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treaty and the supervision of the relevant international court. 
Since the latter option is unfortunate for a number of reasons, 
one should avoid to put a member state in such predicament.
To sum up, there are good arguments to the effect 
that international instruments for the protection of human 
rights provide for some modest level of protection, while 
constitutional rights at the national level may concretize the 
protection of human rights further by providing an additio-
nal level of protection, subject to the democratic deliberation 
in this state.
c) The Supranational Level of Legal Instruments for the 
Protection of Human Rights
A supranational organization is a special kind of inter-
national organization.24 According to the principle of attribu-
ted competences – in the case of the EU, Article 5 (2) Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) – the supranational organization 
has no original legal power.25 Member states transfer some of 
their sovereign rights to this organization which then exer-
cises these sovereign rights by means of the organization’s 
own organs. Characteristic of supranationality is a legislative 
competence of the organization, according to which the legal 
acts of the organizations – in the case of the EU, regulations 
according to Article 288 (2) Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), directives according to Article 288 
(3) TFEU, and decisions according to Article 288 (4) TFEU – 
have direct effect, they are immediately valid and effective 
within the legal systems of the member states.26 What is more, 
24 Matthias Ruffert and Christian Walter, Institutionalized International Law 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), p. 8.
25 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law, 6th edn (Oxford University 
Press, 2015), p. 74.
26 Craig and de Búrca, EU Law (fn. 24), pp. 198-223; Ruffert and Walter, 
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the effective realization of the organization’s ends may well 
require that even legal acts of the organization (secondary 
law) enjoy, at least as a rule, supremacy over national law – 
even over national constitutions.27
The supremacy of supranational law over national 
law creates, however, a dilemma. Owing to this supremacy, 
supranational law can generally not be reviewed by the yar-
dstick of national constitutional rights – ‘inferior law’ cannot 
provide protection against ‘higher law’. This is to say that a 
gap of protection emerges.
One might argue that the exercise of the competen-
ces attributed to the supranational organization might be 
subject to international fundamental rights. The problem 
is, however, that the EU is not – yet28 – formally subject to 
the ECHR. All the members states of the EU are, but the 
EU itself – a legal person of its own according to Article 47 
TEU – has not (yet)29 acceded to this treaty. What is more, 
even if the EU had acceded to the ECHR, one might ask 
whether the modest level of protection under international 
law is adequate for an organization that, without formally 
being a state, interferes with liberty and equality of Euro-
pean citizens in certain areas just as states typically do. For 
Institutionalized International Law (fn. 23), p. 8.
27 There is general agreement that European Union law – both primary and 
secondary law – takes precedence over national law, because otherwise it 
would be impossible to implement the internal market, the Union’s central 
collective economic good. There has been, however, a protracted and heated 
debate as to whether this supremacy is either (1) only very much the rule 
or (2) completely unconditional, see, for example, Craig and de Búrca, 
EU Law (fn. 24), pp. 266-314; see also Martin Borowski, ‘Legal Pluralism 
in the European Union’, in: Law and Democracy in Neil MacCormick’s Legal 
and Political Theory, A. J. Menendez and J. E. Fossum (eds) (Dordrecht, 
Heidelberg, London, and New York: Springer, 2011), pp. 185-209.
28 On the European Union’s accession ot the ECHR, see, infra, section B. III.
29 See, infra, section B. III.
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recourse to constitutional rights is impossible and recourse 
to international fundamental rights not enough, a distinct 
level of supranational protection of human rights is required.
d) Summing Up – The Standard Model
To sum up, both a national and an international level 
of legal instruments for the protection of human rights is 
required – the former does not render the latter superfluous 
nor does the latter the former. The result is a standard model 
of legal instruments for the protection of human rights with 
a comprehensive bill of rights that grant modest protection 
at the international level and a comprehensive bill of rights, 
providing for more protection at the national level.30
30 The idea that the international level only provides for ‘modest protection’ 
in the standard model is based on the assumption that there is significantly 
more protection at the national level by means of constitutional rights and 
proper deliberative democracy in the respective country. In that sense, 
the standard model presupposes an ideal situation. The situation may be, 
however, non-ideal in two respects. To begin with, the legal protection 
of human rights at the national can be deficient. In such a situation the 
normal interplay between the international level and the national level 
does not properly work. The international level has to step in for the 
deficient national level and grant more protection than the standard 
model would require and permit under ideal circumstances. This is to 
say that the level of protection provided for by the international level 
depends to some extent on the protection provided for by the national 
level of constitutional rights – the less protection there is at the national 
level, the more protection at the international level is called for. What is 
more, the extent of discretion (or, in other words, the size of the ‘margin of 
appreciation’) that democratic decisions enjoy vis-á-vis review by means 
of legal instruments for the protection of human rights – be they national 
or international instruments – depends on the deliberative quality of 
democratic decisions. Deliberative democracy is based on the discourse 
rules for the rational practical discourse (on these rules, see Robert Alexy, A 
Theory of Legal Argumentation (Clarendon: Oxford, 1989), pp. 188-206; Jürgen 
Habermas, ‘Diskursethik – Notizen zu einem Begründungsprogramm’, in: 
J. Habermas, Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt on 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), pp. 53-125, at p. 99; Borowski, ‘Discourse Theory 
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Where a supranational organization such as the EU has 
been formed, the characteristics of such an organization call 
for a distinct additional level of supranational instruments 
for the legal protection of human rights, provided for in 
another comprehensive bill of rights. These levels of funda-
mental rights are the two or three necessary levels.
4 Non-Necessary Plurality of Legal Instruments 
for the Protection of Human Rights
There are, however, far more legal instruments for the 
protection of human rights than the necessary levels in this 
standard model would suggest.
a) Comprehensive and Thematic Instruments
For example, there are thematic instruments – such as 
Europe’s torture prevention convention (CPT) – in addition 
in International Law – Human Rights through Discourse’ (fn. 8), pp. 53-56. 
For example, if there were proper democratic elections, with a transparent 
and fair system of financing political parties, a pluralistic media landscape 
and a long, comprehensive, thorough and fair public debate, in which 
the better argument had a good chance to prevail because it is the better 
argument, a good deal of protection of minorities will be realized through 
deliberative democracy. In such a situation greater discretion should be 
accorded to democratic decisions, compared to a situation in which the 
democratic debate was defective – because of an unfair system of financing 
political parties, because of unfair and undue political influence on the 
media, because decisions were taken by ‘experts’ behind closed doors 
‘legitimated’ only formally by democratic elections (on this argument, see 
Martin Borowski, ‘Subjekte der Verfassungsinterpretation’, in: Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, J. Isensee and P. Kirchhof (eds), 
vol. XII: Normativität und Schutz der Verfassung, 3rd edn (Heidelberg: 
C. F. Müller, 2014), pp. 761-782, at p. 779). Where not only the legal protection 
of human rights is deficient at the national level, where also the processes 
of deliberative democracy are significally deficient at the national level, 
there is even more protection required by means of the international level 
of legal protection of human rights. 
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to comprehensive instruments, such as the ECHR. This the-
matic instrument enhances and strengthens the protection 
against torture that is generally provided for by Art. 3 ECHR. 
This is to say that a comprehensive instrument may well pro-
ve non-exhaustive. This added protection does not pose any 
significant structural problems or issues with legal certainty.
b) Two Comprehensive Instruments at the Same Level
Things are different, however, if and when one finds 
two comprehensive instruments at the same level of necessa-
ry instruments. This situation emerges, in particular, where 
an international comprehensive instrument is incorporated 
into a domestic legal system, which records human rights, 
usually at the constitutional level. Both comprehensive ins-
truments lay claim to transforming the protection required 
by human rights into law – at the same level of the legal 
system. What happens in case of conflicting results? To be 
sure, the fact that constitutional rights and international 
human rights are usually open to interpretation means that 
one often arrives – or at least: can arrive – at a convergent 
interpretation. This is not, however, necessarily the case – 
there may be cases in which one cannot avoid to arrive at 
divergent interpretations.
aa) The Criterion of the Formal Rank
On first glance, the formal rank of the two different 
but comprehensive instruments seems decisive. Where the 
national level of constitutional rights is formally superior to a 
comprehensive international instrument incorporated at the 
level of ordinary legislation, the former takes precedence – lex 
superior derogat legi inferiori. Things are more complicated, 
however, if and when constitutional rights must be interpre-
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ted ‘in conformity’ with the international instrument and if 
and when this principle of interpretation ‘in conformity’ with 
international law boasts of constitutional rank itself. This is 
the case with the ECHR in the German legal system, in which 
it is incorporated with the rank of ordinary legislation.31 The 
German Federal Constitutional Court interprets the Basic 
Law, Germany’s post-War constitution, as providing for the 
principle of interpreting the constitution ‘in conformity’ with 
international law in general and the ECHR in particular.32 
Owing to the constitutional rank of the interpretive principle, 
the different domestic rank of the instruments themselves 
– constitutional rank of the constitutional rights and sub-
-constitutional rank of the ECHR – is placed in perspective.
What is more, different formal rank cannot be decisive 
anyway in cases in which the comprehensive instruments 
boast of equal rank. This is the rule in public international 
law, where there is – apart from jus cogens33 – no hierachy 
between and among legal instruments.34 There are also states 
in which international instruments for the legal protection 
of human rights are incorporated into the domestic legal 
system with constitutional rank, in addition to original 
constitutional rights. As a result, there are two comprehen-
sive legal instruments for the protection of human rights at 
the constitutional level – original constitutional rights and 
incorporated international fundamental rights.
bb) The Criterion of Maximum Protection
31 See, for example, Mark W. Janis, Richard S. Kay, and Anthony W. Bradley, 
European Human Rights Law, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 852.
32 BVerfGE 111, 307 (315-330).
33 See supra, section A. II. 3. b).
34 See, for example, Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 
(fn. 16), pp. 22-23.
MARTIN BOROWSKI 385
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 117 | pp. 363-442 | jul./dez. 2018
One might think that the criterion of ‘maximum pro-
tection’ solves the problem. This cannot, however, provide 
a solution in cases where there are fundamental rights at 
stake on two sides of a case. For example, there may be a 
competition between free speech on one hand (constitutio-
nal right 1) and privacy (constitutional right 2) on the other. 
Let’s assume that, in the framework of original constitutional 
rights, free speech takes precedence over privacy. In the 
layer of incorporated international fundamental rights there 
is also a competition between free speech (incorporated in-
ternational fundamental right 1) and privacy (incorporated 
international fundamental right 2). Let’s assume further 
that in this framework privacy takes precedence over free 
speech. In such cases there is a genuine conflict between 
the two layers – both layers provide a different outcome in 
the very same case. One cannot say that one layer provides 
more protection or ‘maximum protection’, compared to the 
other – both provide different forms of protection.35
There can be little doubt that the general problem of 
two comprehensive instruments at the same level of neces-
sary instruments needs further analysis. In the following, an 
enquiry into the relation between the two layers of funda-
mental rights in the European Union will shed some light 
on virtues and vices of two layers of fundamental rights at 
the same level in a legal system.
35 This is a well-known issue of multi-pole relations with an eye to 
fundamental rights – relations between and among the state and two 
or more holders of fundamental rights, see, for example, Tobias Thienel, 
‘Article 53 EMRK’, in: Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und 
Grundfreiheiten – EMRK, Ulrich Karpenstein and Franz C. Mayer (eds), 
2nd edn (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2015), pp. 702-706; Jörg Philipp Terhechte, 
‘Artikel 53 GRC’, marginal number 11, in: Europäisches Unionsrecht, vol. 1, 
H. von der Groeben, J. Schwarze, and A. Hatje (eds), 7th edn (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2015), pp. 835-839; both with further references.
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B. Two Layers of Fundamental Rights in the European 
Union
The primary law of the European Union provides for 
two layers of fundamental rights – unwritten general legal 
principles of Union law and a written bill of rights, the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (ChFR).
I No Bill of Rights in the Initial Treaties
When the founding treaties of the three European 
Communities (European Coal and Steel Community of 1951, 
Euratom of 1957, and European Economic Community of 
1957)36 were drafted, a European bill of rights in written 
primary Community law was not, however, regarded ne-
cessary or desirable. Three reasons for the lack of provisions 
recording fundamental rights in the founding treaties are 
often mentioned. The first reason is the rather limited com-
petence of the Communities at the beginnings of European 
integration.37 Interferences with individuals’ rights by the 
use of Community competence were rather unlikely. Yet the 
competences of the Communities extended significantly over 
time, rendering conflicts between Community law and fun-
damental interests of the individual more and more likely.
36 The ‘European Economic Community’ (EEC) was renamed ‘European 
Community’ (EC) in 1992 with the Treaty of Maastricht (ToM), which also 
founded the ‘European Union’, for the time being as a structure without 
legal personality, embracing three pillars, the supranational EC and the 
intergovernmental ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) and 
‘Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs’ (JHA), the latter 
renamed ‘Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ (PJCC) in 
2003. The two intergovernmental pillars of the EU (ToM) were absorbed 
into the EU (ToL) in 2009, when the EU itself gained legal personality.
37 See, for example, Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies, and Giorgio Monti, 
European Union Law, 3nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 251.
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The second reason for the lack of provisions recording 
fundamental rights in the Founding Treaties is that constitu-
tional rights of the Member States were initially regarded as 
sufficient for the protection of individuals’ fundamental inte-
rests.38 National constitutional law was, however, rendered 
inferior to European law, when the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in Luxemburg claimed ‘supremacy’ of European law 
in seminal decisions in the 1960’s and early 1970’s – van Gend 
en Loos,39 Costa v ENEL,40 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,41 
and Simmenthal42 – and when this claim was, at least on 
principle, accepted by the Member States’ courts. This is to 
say that it became apparent around four decades ago that 
constitutional rights in national constitutions do not have 
power to set limits to Community law. Another reason was 
to avoid a state-like appearance of the Communities. Bills of 
rights are usually found in state constitutions, so that a bill 
of rights might have given the impression that the creation 
of some form of federal state was intended.
At that time the ECJ began to develop fundamental 
rights as general principles of Community law, based on a 
self-created mandate.43 The Court introduced in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft the first ‘source of inspiration’ for funda-
mental rights at the Community level, the ‘constitutional 
38 Chalmers, Davies, and Monti, European Union Law (fn. 35), p. 251.
39 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1.
40 Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL [1964] 12 CMLR 425.
41 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125.
42 Case 106/77, Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629.
43 On the beginnings of the Court’s case law on fundamental rights, see, for 
example, Craig and de Búrca, EU Law (fn. 24), pp. 383-390; Chalmers, Davies, 
and Monti, European Union Law (fn. 35), pp. 251-254; Alan Dashwood et al., 
Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law, 6th edn (Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon: Hart, 2011), pp. 337-339.
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traditions common to the Member States’.44 In 1974, the Court 
added, in Nold, the second ‘source of inspiration’, namely 
‘international treaties for the protection of human rights on 
which the Member States have collaborated or of which they 
are signatories’.45 The ECHR soon proved to be the most im-
portant of such international treaties. These two sources of 
inspiration found their way into the initial version of the TEU 
as established by the Treaty of Maastricht (ToM), in 1993, 
Article F (2).46 This provision amounted, however, to nothing 
more than an endorsement of the doctrinal foundation of 
the Court’s case law. In the current form, Article 6 (3) TEU 
(ToL) reads as follows: ‘Fundamental rights, as guaranteed 
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.‘ Nota 
bene: This provision does not incorporate the ECHR into pri-
mary Union law; it only mentions the ECHR as a ‘source of 
inspiration’ for general principles of Union law.47
II The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union
Considering the import of human rights and the pro-
gress of the project of European integration, the call for a bill 
of rights in written primary Union law became ever more 
pressing at the end of the last century. Based on a mandate 
of the Cologne European Council in 1999, the ‘Charter of 
44 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, para 4.
45 Case 4/73, Nold [1974] ECR 491, para 13. 
46 Later renumbered Article 6 (2) TEU in the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA), in 
1998.
47 See Craig and de Búrca, EU Law (fn. 24), p. 385 with further references.
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Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ was solemnly 
proclaimed in 2000, even if in a legally non-binding form in 
the interim.48 With some amendments the Charter became 
part of the Constitutional Treaty (CT) in Articles II-61 to 
II-114,49 which ultimately failed in 2005 following negative 
outcomes in referenda in France and in the Netherlands. 
After a ‘phase of reflection’ the Member States agreed the 
Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) in December 2007, which went into 
effect on 1 December 2009.50
The reform treaty did not incorporate the text of the 
ChFR into the European Treaties. Rather, a cross-reference 
in Article 6 (1) TEU (ToL) lends legally binding force to the 
Charter in its revised form from 2007.51 This provision reads: 
48 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2000/C 364/01. 
On the mandate of the European Council in Cologne, the convention 
method, and the genesis of the Charter generally, see, for example, Gráinne 
de Búrca, ‘The Drafting of the European Union Charter of Fundamental 
Rights’, European Law Review 26 (2001), pp. 126-138; David Anderson and 
Cian C. Murphy, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights’, in: EU Law after 
Lisbon, A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout, and S. Ripley (eds) (Oxford University Press, 
2012), pp. 155-179, at pp. 155-159.
49 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 2004/C 310/01.
50 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, OJ 2007/C 306/01.
51 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2007/C 303/01. 
It was technically necessary to proclaim the revised version of the Charter 
as an independent document. The initial version from 2000 did not contain 
the amendments that were made when the Charter was included into 
the Constitutional Treaty and the amended version of the Charter from 
2004 was an integral part of a larger document rather than a freestanding 
document (which was reflected in the numbering of the articles). The 
version of the ChFR from 2007 was re-proclaimed together with the 
consolidated version of the European Treaties in 2010, OJ 2010/C 83/02. 
The most recent consolidated document was published in October 2012, 
OJ 2012/362/02. On the three versions of the ChFR, see Martin Borowski, 
‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Treaty on European Union’, in: 
The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law, L. Rubini and M. Trybus 
(eds) (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2012), pp. 200-219, at pp. 207-208.
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‘The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set 
out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 
December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as 
the Treaties.‘ It is worth emphasizing that the decision was 
taken that the ChFR would not replace the ‘old layer’ of fun-
damental rights as general legal principles of Community/
Union law. Rather, the ‘old layer’ was preserved – in Article 
6 (3) TEU (ToL) – and the ChFR was added as a ‘new layer’ 
by means of Article 6 (1) TEU (ToL).
III The European Union and the ECHR
The ‘Council of Europe’ was founded in 1949, distinct 
from the three European Communities, as a classic inter-
national organization. The Council of Europe follows the 
intergovernmental method, by contrast to the supranational 
method that characterized a good part of the Communities 
and characterizes now the European Union. Notwithstan-
ding the fact that all 28 member states of the European Union 
are among the 47 member states of the Council of Europe 
and the ECHR, the ECHR as an instrument in regional in-
ternational law with the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in Strasbourg has, in principle, nothing to do with 
with the EU, EU law and the ECJ in Luxembourg. In parti-
cular, neither the Communities nor the Union were or are 
members of the Council of Europe or the ECHR.52 This is to 
say that the ECtHR in Strasbourg has no jurisdiction over 
the EU or EU law.
It is unfortunate that the EU escapes the jurisdiction 
of the ECHR. All EU member states are member states of 
the ECHR. The have created the EU and transferred some 
52 See, supra, section A. II. 3. c).
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of their sovereign rights to the EU. This lead the ECHR in 
Matthews,53 clarified in Bosphorus,54 to hold that the member 
states of the EU (who are themselves all formally bound by 
the ECHR) are responsible for how the EU (which itself is 
not formally bound by the ECHR) exercises the transfer-
red sovereign rights. To be sure, these sovereign rights are 
exercised autonomously by the EU; the member states have 
little, if any, influence on how EU organs exercise the Union’s 
competences. Thus, Europe’s regional system of protection of 
human rights in international law – the ECHR – will be only 
complete if and when the EU itself is formally subjected to 
the ECHR and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR in Strasbourg.
There has been quite some debate on the accession of 
the EC/EU to the ECHR since it had become apparent that 
the Community exercised the sovereign rights transferred to 
it autonomously. In its famous and notorious opinion from 
1994 the ECJ stated that the Community lacked competence 
to accede to the ECHR.55 Roughly two decades later it was 
finally agreed in the ToL that the Union would accede to the 
ECHR. Article 6 (2) clause 1 TEU (ToL), reads: ‘The Union 
shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms‘. There can 
be little doubt that this provision establishes a binding legal 
obligation.56 To be sure, ‘accession’ does not become a reality 
simply by being provided for in primary Union law; it must 
be established according to the rules of the Council of Europe. 
53 Matthews v. United Kingdom, Appl. no. 24833/94, Decision of 18 February 
1999, CEDH 1999-I.
54 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Tocaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, Appl. no. 
45036/98, Judgment of 30 June 2005, CEDH 2005-VI.
55 Opinion Pursuant to Article 228 (6) Treaty on European Community (TEC) 
[now Article 218 (11) TFEU], 28 March 1996, Court of Justice of the European 
Union, Case C-2/94.
56 See Craig and de Búrca, EU Law (fn. 24), p. 420.
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Generally the ECHR was and is open to the member states 
of the Council of Europe. According to Art. 4 clause 1, Sta-
tute of the Council of Europe of 1949, ‘European states’ can 
become members of the Council of Europe: ‘Any European 
State which is deemed to be able and willing to fulfil the 
provisions of Article 3 may be invited to become a member 
of the Council of Europe by the Committee of Ministers.‘ This 
rules the EU out, since it is a particular kind of international 
organization rather than a ‘state’. At any rate, Protocol No. 
14 to the ECHR of 2004 (in force since 2010) amended the 
ECHR by adding Article 59 (2) ECHR: ‘The European Union 
may accede to this Convention.‘
This provision looks, however, more promising than 
it actually is. The most important problem is that the EU 
has refused to accede to the ECHR by means of a one-sided 
legal declaration. To preserve the unique characteristic of the 
Union and Union law, an accession agreement is called for, 
in which a number of amendments to the ECHR are made 
to accommodate the special nature of the EU. The formal 
process follows the general rules for concluding treaties in 
Article 218 TFEU. The substantive requirements are set out 
in ‘Protocol (No 8) relating to article 6 (2) of the Treaty on 
European Union on the accession of the Union to the Euro-
pean Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms’. In short: In a lengthy and difficult 
process a ‘Draft Accession Agreement’ was drawn up, but 
rejected by the ECJ in its Opinion 2/13.57 This opinion has 
brought the process of accession to a grinding halt and it is 
currently unclear how and when the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR will have been accomplished.58
57 Opinion Pursuant to Article 218 (11) TFEU, 18 December 2014, Court of 
Justice of the European Union, Case C-2/13.
58  See, for example, Steve Peers, ‘The EU’s Accession to the ECHR – The 
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IV Summing Up
The EU has two layers of comprehensive legal instru-
ments for the protection of human rights: First, the layer of 
general principles of Union law according to Article 6 (3) 
TEU (ToL), which alone had to bear the load of protecting 
fundamental rights at the Community/Union level prior 
to the Treaty of Lisbon and, second, the ChFR according to 
Art. 6 (1) TEU (ToL). 
C The Debate on the Protocol on the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights
Why was the decision taken to retain the ‘old layer’ in 
Article 6 (3) TEU? What is the relationship between these two 
layers? An analysis of the debate on the ‘Protocol (No 30) 
on the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union’ (PoC) will shed some light on this issue.
I The Genesis of the Protocol on the ChFR
The ChFR is binding, above all, for the Union and its 
institutions. It is also legally binding for the member states, 
albeit ‘only when they are implementing Union law’, Ar-
ticle 51 (1) ChFR.59 When member states are acting in the 
Dream Becomes a Nightmare’, German Law Journal 16 (2015), pp. 213-222; 
Craig and de Búrca, EU Law (fn. 24), pp. 421-422; Turkuler Isiksel, ‘European 
Exceptionalism and the EU’s Accession to the ECHR’, European Journal of 
International Law 27 (2016), pp. 565-589.
59 The interpretation of the term ‘implement’ in Article 51 (1) ChFR is the 
linchpin of the determination of the Charter’s field of application vis-à-
vis Member States. Note that the phrase ‘when [the Member States] are 
implementing Union law’ might be narrower than the phrase ‘acting in 
the scope of Union law’. The ECJ held, for example, in ERT that ‘it has no 
power to examine the compatibility with the ECHR of national rules which 
do not fall within the scope of Community law. On the other hand, where 
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sphere of their original sovereignty, they are not committed 
to Union law in general and the ChFR in particular. The 
Charter’s binding force at the national level gave, however, 
some Member States cause for serious concern. The driving 
force for the ‘Protocol on the Application of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and 
such rules do fall within the scope of Community law, and reference is 
made to the Court for a preliminary ruling, it must provide all the criteria 
of interpretation needed by the national court to determine whether those 
rules are compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of which 
the Court ensures’, Case C-260/89, ERT, [1991] ECR I-2925, para 42. The 
debate in the Convention on the Charter and the expression that was finally 
agreed – ‘only when they are implementing Union law’ – suggests that the 
Charter’s field of application was intended to be narrower than the field of 
application of fundamental rights as general principles of Union law, Art. 
6 (3) TEU (ToL), according to the ERT formula of the ECJ. This is to say that 
the field of application of the ChFR to member states would be narrower 
than the field of application of fundamental rights as general principles 
of Union law. The ‘old layer’ could then fill a gap that the ChFR, the ‘new 
layer’, leaves open. If this was a purpose of retaining the ‘old layer’, this 
arguably proved superfluous later. Note that the ‘Explanations Relating 
to the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (Conv 354/02, WG II 16, OJ 2007/C 
303/02) – which exhibit no binding force, see, infra, section C. V. 2. a) (aa) – 
ignore this difference. There the phrase ‘only when they are implementing 
Union law’ in Art. 51 (1) clause 1 ChFR is characterized in the tradition of 
the ERT formula. Referring to these explanations, the ECJ held in Åkerberg 
Fransson: ‘Since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must 
therefore be complied with where national legislation falls within the 
scope of European Union law, situations cannot exist which are covered in 
that way by European Union law without those fundamental rights being 
applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails applicability of 
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.’ (Case 617/10, Åkerberg 
Fransson [2013] 2 CMLR 46, para 21). While there may be good arguments 
on behalf of the idea that fundamantal rights cover also cases in which the 
member states are acting ‘within the scope of Union law’ (see, for example, 
Bernhard Schima, EU Fundamental Rights and Member State Action After 
Lisbon: Putting the ECJ’s Case Law in its Context, Fordham International 
Law Journal 38 (2015), pp. 1098-1133, at p. 1108; Craig and de Búrca, EU Law 
(fn. 24), pp. 415-418; both with further references), it is noteworthy that a 
gap resulting from a narrow interpretation of the field of application of 
the ChFR could have been filled by means of the ‘old layer’.
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to the United Kingdom’ (Protocol No. 30) was the United 
Kingdom.60 In the negotiations leading to the Lisbon Treaty 
in 2007 it expressed its wish to ‘clarify’ certain legal effects 
of the Charter. A protocol to the European treaties counts 
as a part of those treaties (Article 51 TEU), so that a protocol 
has the legal power to establish leges speciales at the level of 
primary EU law. Considering that the United Kingdom had 
signed the Constitutional Treaty, which included the ChFR 
as Part II, without any formal reservation two years earlier, 
the fact that its government insisted on a protocol strikes 
one as somewhat surprising.61 In September 2007, Poland 
declared its wish to join this protocol. As a result, the Protocol 
on the ChFR was annexed to the Reform Treaty of Lisbon 
as Protocol No. 30.
When The Czech Republic was the last member state to 
ratify the Lisbon Treaty in autumn 2009, it made ratification 
dependent on the guarantee that the notorious Beneš decrees 
from 1945-1946 would not be called into question.62 Against 
60 Anthony Arnull, ‘Protocol (No 30) on the Application of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and the United 
Kingdom’, in: The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, S. Peers, T. Hervey, 
J. Kenner, and A. Ward (eds) (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2014), 
pp. 1595-1612, at pp. 1599-1601.
61 See Paul Craig, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, Process, Architecture and Substance’, 
European Law Review 33 (2008). pp. 137-166, at p. 163; Paul Craig, The Lisbon 
Treaty (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 238; Arnull, ‘Protocol (No 30) 
(fn. 58), p. 1600.
62 These decrees stripped the citizenship and appropriated the land of some 
two and a half million Germans, among other Europeans, after World War 
II. On the history and the circumstances on the expulsion of Germans, 
see Eagle Glassheim, ‘National Mythologies and Ethnic Cleansing: The 
Expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans in 1945’, Central European History 
33 (2000), pp. 463-486. On the Beneš decrees in the context of the Czech 
Republic’s ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, see Steve Peers, ‘The Beneš 
Decrees and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, available at: www.
statewatch.org/news/2009/oct/lisbon-benes-decree.pdf, accessed on 14 
October 2018. There are convincing reasons to assume that the ChFR 
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this backdrop, the Heads of State agreed at the European 
Council in Brussels from 29 to 30 October 2009 to comply 
with the request of the Czech Republic to join Protocol No. 
30. According to the Presidency Conclusions, the ‘Protocol 
on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union to the Czech Republic’ was to ‘be 
annexed’ to the European Treaties.63 Annexing a protocol to 
the European treaties counts as a treaty amendment, which 
needs ratification by all member states. It was envisaged to 
include the Czech Protocol into primary Union law with the 
next accession treaty. Owing to domestic political changes 
in the Czech Republic, the application to join the United 
Kingdom and Poland was eventually withdrawn in 2014.64 
It is also worth mentioning that Ireland had initially reser-
ved the right to join the Protocol on the Charter, but finally 
desisted from joining.65
would have had little effect on the legal evaluation of the Beneš decrees 
anyway. In that sense, it was more a symbolic political statement on the 
part of the Czech Government when it made ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty dependent on its right to join the British and Polish Protocol on the 
ChFR.
63 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council on 29/30 
October 2009, 15265/09 CONCL 3, Annex I. See Rudolf Streinz, ’Rechtliche 
Verankerung der Garantien für Irland und der “Fußnote” für Tschechien’, 
in: Rechtsfragen der Implementierung des Vertrages von Lissabon, T. 
Eilmannsberger et al. (eds) (Vienna: Springer, 2011), pp. 23-45, at pp. 35-38.
64 On these developments between 2009 and 2014, see Jacques Ziller, ‘Das 
Protokoll Nr. 30 über die Anwendung der Charta der Grundrechte 
der europäischen Union auf Polen und das Vereinigte Königreich’, in: 
Europäische Grundrechte-Charta, K. Stern and M. Sachs (eds) (Munich: C.H. 
Beck, 2016), pp. 98-108, at pp. 100-102.
65 In discussions prior to the negative result in the first Irish referendum on 
the Treaty of Lisbon some issues related to fundamental rights played a 
prominent role. In particular, fear was spread by opponents of the Lisbon 
Treaty that the ChFR would force more ‘liberal’ laws on abortion in Ireland. 
The Treaty of Maastricht, however, saw the introduction of Protocol No 17 
on the protection of unborn life in Ireland: ‘Protocol on Article 40.3.3 of the 
Constitution of Ireland’, see Cathryn Costello, ‘Ireland’s Nice Referenda’, 
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The motives of the three Member States for negotiating 
and joining the Protocol were different. The government of 
the United Kingdom expressed concerns about social and 
economic rights in the Charter, especially the right to strike.66 
These concerns had earlier, in 2004, led to amendments to the 
initial version of the Charter with the intent of limiting the 
‘justiciability’ of social and economic rights in the ChFR, in 
particular, in Title IV. It is far from clear, however, whether 
the relevant provisions – Article II-112 (5) and (7) CT, which 
became later Article 52 (5) and (7) ChFR – in fact secure that 
social and economic rights are ‘non-justiciable’.67 The insight 
that even the amended form of the Charter does not rule out 
that social and economic rights are regarded as ‘justiciable’ 
may well have played a role in the United Kingdom’s deci-
sion to request another safeguard, the Protocol on the ChFR. 
What is more, the Protocol played a crucial role in internal 
affairs of the United Kingdom, namely, for the decision on 
whether a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty was to be held.68
European Constitutional Law Review 1 (2005), pp. 357-382, at p. 362. This 
protocol became Protocol No 35 to the Lisbon Treaty. A complex package of 
guarantees assuaging Irish concerns was negotiated and agreed at various 
meetings of the European Council in 2008 and 2009, see Jean-Claude Piris, 
The Lisbon Treaty (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 51-60. In the end, 
Ireland refrained from joining the Protocol on the ChFR.
66 Arnull, ‘Protocol (No 30) (fn. 58), p. 1600; Ziller, ‘Das Protokoll Nr. 30’ 
(fn. 62), p. 99.
67 See, infra, section C. V. 2. a).
68 On this dimension of the Protocol, see Michael Dougan, ‘The Treaty of 
Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’, Common Market Law Review 
45 (2008), pp. 617-703, at pp. 665-666; Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (fn. 59), 
p. 238; Stephen Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law, 9th edn (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2010), p. 70; Arnull, ‘Protocol (No 30) (fn. 58), 
p. 1600. On the political background in the United Kingdom at that time, 
see Brendan Donnelly, ‘A British Referendum on the Treaty?’, in: Der Vertrag 
von Lissabon: Reform der EU ohne Verfassung? – Kolloquium zum 10. Geburtstag 
des Walter Hallstein-Instituts für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, I. Pernice (ed) 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), pp. 207-212.
The misgivings of the Polish government were different 
in nature. It took no issue with social and economic rights.69 
Rather, potential repercussions of some Charter rights on 
family law, first and foremost on abortion and on the issue 
of ‘same-sex-marriages’ were advanced, and concerns over 
claims for compensation for expropriations of Germans after 
World War II.70 In addition to joining the Protocol, Poland 
made a unilateral declaration on certain aspects of legal 
effects of the ChFR.71
II An Overview of the Protocol on the ChFR
Apart from a full page of recitals, the Protocol boasts 
of two Articles. Article 1 (1) states that the Charter ‘does 
not extend the ability’ of the ECJ or any Polish or British 
court to find that ‘the laws, regulations or administrative 
69 On the contrary, Poland expressed explicitly in the ‘Declaration by the 
Republic of Poland Concerning the Protocol on the Application of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in Relation to Poland 
and the United Kingdom (Declaration No 62)’ to respect the rights in Title 
IV of the Charter ‘fully’. Considering the role of the trade unions in Poland’s 
modern history, it does not come as a surprise that Poland endorses social 
and labour rights. Thus, one might say that negotiating an own protocol 
rather than joining the United Kingdom’s protocol would have been more 
consequent for Poland. This was, however, hardly a realistic political 
option.
70 See Arnull, ‘Protocol (No 30)’ (fn. 58), p. 1601; Ziller, ‘Das Protokoll Nr. 30’ 
(fn. 62), p. 100. The former concern is well expressed in Poland’s unilateral 
declaration mentioned in footnote 69.
71 See Declarations Annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental 
Conference which Adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, ‘Declaration by the 
Republic of Poland on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (Declaration No 61)’, OJ 2007/C 115, p. 358: ‘The Charter does not 
affect in any way the right of Member States to legislate in the sphere of 
public morality, family law as well as the protection of human dignity and 
respect for human physical and moral integrity.’ Unlike a protocol to the 
treaties, such unilateral declarations do have the force of primary Union 
law.
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provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the United 
Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, fre-
edoms and principles that it reaffirms.’ Article 1 (2) of the 
Protocol ‘clarifies’ that ‘nothing in Title IV of the Charter 
creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United 
Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom 
has provided for such rights in its national law.’ Finally, to 
the extent that a provision of the Charter refers to national 
law or national practices, ‘it shall only apply to Poland or 
the United Kingdom to the extent that the rights or princi-
ples that it contains are recognised in the law or practices of 
Poland or of the United Kingdom’, Article 2.
These two articles, which have been – understandably 
– characterized as ‘extremely clumsily worded’,72 raise a 
great many questions. Before a more detailed analysis of the 
provisions of the Protocol will be front and centre, a more 
general issue deserves attention: the nature of the Protocol 
on the Charter. Is it an ‘opt-out’ or a mere ‘clarification’?
72 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies, and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law, 
2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 258 (text changed in the 3rd 
edn). See also Dashwood et al., Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law 
(fn. 41), p. 386: ‘[T]he wording is so carefully drafted as to be nebulous’; 
Arnull, ‘Protocol (No 30)’ (fn. 58), p. 1610: ‘Considering its brevity, Protocol 
30 is unusually difficult to understand’; Vojtech Belling, ‘Supranational 
Fundamental Rights or Primacy of Sovereignty? Legal Effects of the So-
Called Opt-Out from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, European 
Law Journal 18 (2012), pp. 251-268, at p. 251: ‘one of the most difficult-to-
interpret changes to primary law’; Ulrich Haltern, Europarecht – Dogmatik 
im Kontext, vol. 2: Rule of Law, Verbunddogmatik, Grundrechte (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2017), p. 656: ‘Das Protokoll dürfte zu den seltsamsten Blüten 
gehören, die das Unionsrecht je hervorgebracht hat, und es hat die Juristen 
weitgehend ratlos zurückgelassen.’ In English: ‘The Protocol is one of the 
strangest flowers that Union law has ever produced and jurists have been, 
by and large, at a loss’ (trans by M.B.).
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III The Nature of the Protocol – ‘Opt-Out’ versus ‘Clari-
fication’
While some commentators refer to the Protocol on the 
ChFR as an ‘opt-out’,73 others insist emphatically that it is a 
‘clarification’ or an ‘interpretative Protocol’.74 In fact, the ex-
pressions ‘clarify’ and ‘clarifying’ can be found in the eighth 
recital and the ninth recital of the PoC. One commentator 
expressed the confusion on the nature of the Protocol by 
calling it a ‘non-opt-out opt-out.’75 The reason for the con-
fusion in the debate on the nature of the Protocol is that the 
expressions ‘opt-out’, ‘clarification’, and comparable terms 
are used with different meanings.
It is characteristic of an ‘opt-out’ from a legal instru-
ment that legal effects to which that instrument gives rise 
are changed. An opt-out that changes no legal effects what-
soever is conceptually impossible; it is conceptually not 
an opt-out. Opt-outs need not, however, render the legal 
instrument in question wholly inapplicable; they can be 
complete or partial. Partial opt-outs affect only some legal 
effects of the relevant legal instrument. This can range from 
a nearly complete opt-out to a very modest partial opt-out, 
73 See, for example, Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘The Reality of Rights: From 
Rhetoric to Opt-Out’, European Law Review 34 (2009), pp. 815-816, at p. 816; 
René Barents, ‘The Court of Justice after the Treaty of Lisbon’, Common 
Market Law Review 47 (2010), pp. 709-728, at p. 721.
74 See, for example, House of Lords – European Union Committee (HoL – 
EUC), 10th Report of Session 2007-08, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: an Impact 
Assessment’, vol. 1, paras 5.87 and 5.103 (d); Daniel Denman, ‘The Charter 
of Fundamental Rights’, (2010) European Human Rights Law Review (2010), 
pp. 349-359, at p. 355. See also Ingolf Pernice, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon and 
Fundamental Rights’, in: The Lisbon Treaty – EU Constitutionalism without a 
Constitutional Treaty?, S. Griller and J. Ziller (eds) (Vienna and New York: 
Springer, 2008), pp. 235-256, at p. 245 et passim.
75 Catherine Barnard, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Happy 10th 
Birthday’, European Union Studies Association Review (2011), pp. 5-10, at p. 7.
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which changes relatively little of the effects of the legal ins-
trument in question. Thus, the expression ‘opt-out’ covers a 
broad spectrum, ranging from a complete opt-out to a very 
modest partial opt-out.
A ‘clarification’ authoritatively interprets a legal instru-
ment. Among all plausible interpretations of this legal instru-
ment one certain interpretation is declared to be authoritative 
and, therefore, legally binding. On a superficial reading, it 
seems that this does not change the legal situation at all. This 
impression is, however, deceptive. All competing interpre-
tations of the relevant legal instrument are ruled out, even 
if there are good or even compelling arguments on behalf 
of them. For example, if there are convincing arguments for 
an interpretation of this or that provision in Title IV of the 
ChFR, according to which this provision grants a justiciable 
right, one might say that Article 1 (2) of the Protocol ‘clari-
fies’ the interpretation of the relevant provisions in Title IV 
of the Charter to the effect that this provision does actually 
not grant a justiciable right, in so far as the commitment of 
Poland and the United Kingdom is concerned. It is hard to 
miss, however, that calling such a protocol a ‘clarification’ or 
an ‘interpretive protocol’ is a euphemism for a partial opt-
-out. Thus, it is crucial to understand that one cannot simply 
put ‘opt-out’ opposite to ‘clarification’ – a ‘clarification’ can 
indeed be a partial opt-out.
There is, however, a different terminology, according to 
which ‘opt-out’ and ‘clarification’ are actually put opposite. 
Some use the term ‘opt-out’ in a very narrow sense, accor-
ding to which only a complete opt-out counts conceptually 
as an ‘opt-out’. Paradigmatic is a quotation from the Report 
of the European Union Committee of the House of Lords on 
the Lisbon Treaty: ‘The Protocol is not an opt-out from the 
Charter. The Charter will apply in the UK, even if its inter-
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pretation may be affected by the terms of the Protocol.’76 Even 
a superficial reading of the text of the Protocol on the ChFR 
makes clear, however, that this protocol not simply renders 
the Charter inapplicable to the United Kingdom and Poland. 
In this sense the statement that the Protocol is not an opt-out 
in the sense of a complete opt-out is trivial.77 Consequently, 
Advocate General Verica Trstenjak stated in her opinion on a 
preliminary reference from a British court that ‘the question 
whether Protocol No 30 is to be regarded as a general opt-
-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Poland can be easily answered 
in the negative.’78 To be sure, the true problem is whether and 
to what extent the Protocol changes the legal commitment of 
the United Kingdom and Poland to the ChFR, compared to 
the legal effects of the ChFR to other Member States of the 
EU. In other words, the true question is of whether and to 
76 HoL – EUC (fn. 72), at para 5.87. See also the preceding two paragraphs, 
in which expert opinions are quoted. See also Piris, The Lisbon Treaty 
(fn. 63), p. 161: ‘A lot of commentators have considered that Protocol No. 30 
constitutes an opt-out from the Charter. One can express that this opinion 
is not legally the case. There is no provision in the Protocol stating clearly 
that the Charter will not be legally binding for the United Kingdom and 
Poland’.
77 Thus, the statement of the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the 
Home Department – ‘The purpose of the Charter Protocol is not to prevent 
the Charter from applying to the United Kingdom’ – in Saaedi (Court of 
Appeal (Civil Division), The Queen on the Application of NS v. Secretary Of 
State For The Home Department, [2010] EWCA Civ 990, para 7) was hardly 
surprising. See also Patrick Layden and Tobias Lock, ‘Protection of 
Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon: The Interaction between the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and National Constitutions’, United Kingdom National Report 
for the FIDE XXV Congress, pp. 1-49, at p. 29, available at SSRN: http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1940381 (accessed 14 October 2018): To claim ‘that the 
Protocol in any way exempts the UK from from its obligations under the 
Charter’ would be ‘an odd proposition’.
78  Opinion of Advocate General Verica Trstenjak from 22 September 2011, 
Case C-411/10, NS v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, para 167.
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which extent the Protocol on the Charter is a partial opt-out. 
And, to repeat, there are no convincing reasons to limit the 
use of the term ‘opt-out’ to complete opt-outs.
Even if a ‘clarification’ can be a partial opt-out, it is not 
necessarily such an opt-out. It depends on whether one had 
to choose the interpretation, which the ‘clarification’ declares 
to be authoritative, in any case. If there is no seriously compe-
ting alternative interpretation of the legal instrument in ques-
tion, a ‘clarification’ actually changes nothing whatsoever. 
This was the position of the United Kingdom Government 
when the Protocol was negotiated. A leading member of this 
government stated: The Protocol ‘puts beyond doubt what 
should have been obvious from other provisions’.79 In the 
same vein: ‘The negotiations at the June European Council 
and the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference provided 
[UK] Government with the opportunity to bolster existing 
safeguards and set in stone how the Charter will operate 
in the UK, as in all Member States.’80 From this standpoint 
the Protocol only spells out how the provisions of the ChFr 
are to be interpreted in all Member States rather than only 
in the United Kingdom and Poland.81 The following line in 
the report of the European Union Committee of the House 
of Lords on the Lisbon Treaty does not come as a surprise, 
then: ‘[I]t is perhaps a matter of regret, and even a source 
79 Jack Straw, quoted in HoL – EUC (fn. 72), at para 5.96.
80 Lord Goldsmith, quoted in HoL – EUC (fn. 72), at para 5.102.
81 Catherine Barnard points to the eighth recital of the Protocol on the ChFR 
as evidence that this was actually the ‘original intention behind Protocol 30’, 
but that then ‘only Poland and the United Kingdom agreed to it’, Barnard, 
‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Happy 10th Birthday’ (fn. 73), p. 7. 
The eighth recital notes, however, the ‘wish’ only ‘of Poland and the United 
Kingdom to clarify certain aspects of the application of the Charter’. The 
wording of the following recital, the ninth recital, makes clear that legal 
effects of the Charter vis-à-vis other Member States are not affected.
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of potential confusion, that it was not expressed to apply to 
all Member States.’82
If one is convinced that a different interpretation of the 
ChFR is seriously competing or even more convincing than 
the interpretation favoured by the Government of the United 
Kingdom, things change. From this standpoint the Protocol 
on the ChFR is a partial opt-out (see above). To state the ob-
vious: The very fact that a protocol with the ‘clarification’ was 
regarded necessary by the United Kingdom suggests that 
the other Member States did not share the United Kingdom 
Government’s view on how to interpret the ChFR.
To conclude, the Protocol on the ChFR is a ‘clarification’ 
or an ‘interpretative protocol’ in the sense that the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom tried to establish its own parti-
cular interpretation of the ChFR as authoritative. In so far as 
there are good or even compelling arguments for a different 
interpretation – the following sections will demonstrate that 
this is the case for two of the three provisions of the Protocol 
on the Charter – the Protocol proves to be a partial opt-out.
IV The General Fear of ‘Competence Creep’
The Protocol on the ChFR has been characterized as 
an expression of the fear of ‘competence creep’.83 As already 
82 HoL – EUC (fn. 72), at para 5.103 (d). See also Layden and Lock, ‘Protection 
of Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon’ (fn. 75), pp. 29-30. Surprisingly, a 
German commentator supported the view that Article 1 (2) PoC counts as 
an authoritative interpretation of the provisions in Title IV of the ChFR, 
which is binding for all Member States (he does not, however, mention 
the EU itself): Franz Josef Lindner, ‘Zur grundsätzlichen Bedeutung des 
Protokolls über die Anwendung der Grundrechtecharta auf Polen und 
das Vereinigte Königreich’, Europarecht 43 (2008), pp. 786-799, at p. 798. This 
view cannot, however, be reconciled with the clear wording of Article 1 
(2) PoC, in which only ‘justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United 
Kingdom’ are ruled out.
83 See, for example, Dashwood et al., Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union 
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mentioned,84 the EU has attributed competences rather than 
the original power in the sense of sovereignty, Article 5 (2) 
TEU. Competence creep is the phenomenon, according to 
which the competences attributed to the Union are inter-
preted excessively wide at the cost of the original sovereign 
competence of the Member States. This issue was particularly 
discussed with an eye to rather general attributed competen-
ces of the Community, in particular Article 95 and 308 TEC. 
The Treaty of Lisbon has brought about some substantive 
and procedural changes in the general distribution of com-
petences between the Union and the Member States, some 
of which address the concern of competence creep.85
With an eye to the general fear of competence creep 
by means of provisions of the ChFR it deserves to be em-
phasized that the Treaty of Lisbon contains a provision that 
explicitly rules out such competence creep. Immediately after 
the cross-reference in Article 6 (1) TEU (ToL) that incorpo-
rates the ChFR into primary EU law, one reads in clause 2: 
‘The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way 
the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.’ In 
the same vein, Article 51 (2) ChFR states: ‘The Charter does 
not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the 
powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for 
Law (fn. 41), p. 386.
84 See, supra, section A. II. 3. c).
85 On the discussion on ‘competence creep’, see Stephen Weatherill, 
‘Competence Creep and Competence Control’, Yearbook of European Law 23 
(2004), pp. 1-55; Paul Craig, ‘Competence: Clarity, Conferral, Containment 
and Consideration’, European Law Review 29 (2004), pp. 323-44; Dashwood et 
al., Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law (fn. 41), p. 105-111. Specifically 
on the changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon, see Dougan, ‘The 
Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’ (fn. 66), at pp. 652-661; 
Craig, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, Process, Architecture and Substance’ (fn. 59), 
pp. 144-151; Craig and de Búrca, EU Law (fn. 24), pp. 75-103.
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the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the 
Treaties.’
It is far from clear, however, whether these blanket 
provisions ruling out a competence creep effectively bar 
the interpretation of the provisions of the ChFR the United 
Kingdom and Poland were worried about.86 In that sense it 
is perfectly understandable that the governments of these 
Member States felt that they could not simply rely on Arti-
cle 6 (1) clause 2 TEU (ToL) and Article 51(2) ChFR. Rather, 
these issues are a matter of the interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the ChFR.
V The Three Provisions of the Protocol on the ChFR
The analysis of whether and to what extent the Proto-
col limits the legal effects of the ChFR has to be carried out 
for each of the three provisions of the Protocol respectively. 
There is, however, one aspect common to all three provisions: 
they concern only legal effects of the ChFR vis-à-vis the Uni-
ted Kingdom and Poland. Pursuant to the three provisions 
of the Protocol, the commitment of the institutions of the 
Union and of other Member States to the Charter are left 
untouched. In this sense, the question is not whether the 
ChFR applies in the United Kingdom and Poland. Everyo-
ne in these member states may file an action for annulment 
according to Article 269 (4) TFEU against a legal act of the 
Union, based on a supposed violation of a right in the ChFR. 
The question is only to what extent the ChFR applies to the 
United Kingdom and to Poland.
86  As already mentioned, the specific concerns of the United Kingdom 
and Poland were quite different, see, supra, section C. I.
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1 No ‘Extension’ of the Power of Courts through 
the ChFR, Article 1(1) PoC
The Protocol does not generally rule out any legal 
effects of the Charter vis-à-vis the United Kingdom and 
Poland. Rather, it states that the ChFR does not ‘extend’ the 
power of the ECJ, British, and Polish courts to find a violation 
of rights of the ChFR by these Member States.
a) The Point of Comparison: Article 6 (3) TEU (ToL) – the 
‘Old Layer’
‘Extend’ compared to what? As explained in section B., 
the architectonic of the protection of fundamental rights in 
the Lisbon Treaty comprises two layers, the ChFR according 
to Article 6 (1) TEU (ToL) – the ‘new layer’ – and fundamental 
rights as general principles of Union law according to Arti-
cle 6 (3) TEU (ToL) – the ‘old layer’. Against this backdrop, 
the point of comparison for whether the ChFR extends the 
power of courts is the other main instrument, the ‘old layer’. 
Thus, in so far as fundamental rights as general principles of 
Union law correspond to rights of the ChFR, the ChFR does 
not extend any judicial power. Where the ‘new layer’ does 
not go beyond the ‘old layer’, nothing is extended. To the 
extent in which the legal protection of fundamental rights as 
general principles of Union law and as rights in the ChFR are 
congruent, even Poland and the United Kingdom are fully 
committed to the ChFR. To be sure, whether they are actually 
completely congruent or whether and to which extent they 
are not congruent, is precisely the contentious issue.
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b) The ChFR as a Mere Reaffirmation of Rights Already 
Granted?
The ChFR ‘extends’ the protection of fundamental 
rights compared to general principles of Union law, if and 
when the ChFR grants additional protection. The greater the 
additional protection, the greater the extension. Commen-
tators often emphasize, however, that the ChFR is a mere 
‘reaffirmation’ of rights. If this is literally true, the ChFR 
does not ‘extend’ the protection of fundamental rights.87 
Indeed, the fifth recital of the Preamble to the ChFR explici-
tly states that the ChFR ‘reaffirms’ the rights as they result 
from constitutional traditions of the member states and their 
international obligations, and from the case law of the ECJ 
and the ECtHR. What is more, the sixth recital of the Protocol 
also emphasizes that the Charter ‘reaffirms’ rights, and that 
it ‘does not create new rights or principles.’ Finally, Article 1 
(1) PoC also underscores that the Charter ‘reaffirms’ rights.
(aa) Plausible Cases of Innovations and Extensions
It is certainly true that the ChFR is not first and foremost 
a collection of innovations. Commentators have, however, 
noted that the Charter contains ‘several innovative provi-
sions’, for example, the prohibition of reproductive cloning 
of human beings according to Article 3 (2) lit d ChFR. This 
suggests that there is a new right not to be cloned. Or is this 
only a reaffirmation of the right to the singularity of the human 
being that was/is already contained in human dignity as a 
87 See, for example, HoL – EUC (fn. 72), at para 5.103 (a); Denman, ‘The Charter 
of Fundamental Rights’ (fn. 72), p. 355; Craig, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, Process, 
Architecture and Substance’ (fn. 59), p. 163; Pernice, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 
and Fundamental Rights’ (fn. 72), p. 245.
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general principle of Community/Union law?88 The same 
could be asked for Article 13 ChFR, freedom of the arts – is 
this a new right, or was/is this right already covered by 
fundamental rights as general principles of Community/
Union law?89 To give only a third example,90 the wording 
of the right to marry and to found a family, Article 9 ChFR, 
has changed compared to Article 12 ECHR, and this may 
well have strengthened the protection.91 To be sure, what 
counts as a ‘new right’ or as a ‘reaffirmation of an old right’ 
depends on the interpretation of the acquis communitaire of 
fundamental rights as general principles of Community/
Union law, which is in many respects unclear and contro-
versial. There are, however, at least plausible arguments on 
behalf of the thesis that the ChFR strengthens the protection 
here and there to some extent.
(bb) More Weight in the Balancing
What is more, a ‘reaffirmation’ of rights can streng-
then the protection of rights that were, in principle, already 
granted. According to the fourth recital of the Preamble to 
the Charter, ‘it is necessary to strengthen the protection of 
fundamental rights […] by making those rights more visible 
in a Charter.’ If the Charter is supposed to strengthen the pro-
tection of mainly pre-existing rights, the protection of rights 
88 On human dignity as a general principle of Community law, see Case 
C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH [2004] ECR 
I-9641, para 34.
89 See Barnard, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Happy 10th Birthday’ 
(fn. 73), p. 8.
90 There may well be more examples. See, for example, on Articles 47 and 50 
ChFR, Layden and Lock, ‘Protection of Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon’ 
(fn. 75), pp. 27-28.
91 See footnote 154.
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already granted – as general principles of Community law 
– needs to be strengthened. What, then, changes by ‘making 
[…] rights more visible in a Charter’? The difference brought 
about by the Treaty of Lisbon is that the ECJ now has a clear, 
explicit, and detailed mandate to protect fundamental rights 
in a bill of rights in written primary Union law.
This mandate has more authoritative force, compared 
to the self-created mandate of the ECJ to determine funda-
mental rights as general legal principles in its own case law.92 
Even though this mandate was confirmed by Article F (2) 
TEU (ToM) and later Article 6 (2) TEU (ToA), this confirma-
tion was purely formulaic and did not place fundamental 
rights fully on equal par with rights expressly provided for 
in the European Treaties, particularly with the Community’s 
and later the Union’s market freedoms. A much clearer and 
stronger mandate in written primary Union law strengthens 
the protection of the rights by giving them, not least of all, 
more weight in the balancing with competing rights and 
interests.93 This view is increasingly shared among com-
mentators. In their standard work on constitutional law by 
Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, they write: ‘[T]here can 
be no doubt that […] the Charter has significantly raised the 
profile of rights in the EU legal order. […] Even if the Charter 
of itself does not alter the content of EU law (by adding to its 
rights), surely it is likely to alter the weight to be accorded in 
EU law to such rights as are contained in the Charter.’94 Or, to 
quote Catherine Barnard: ‘[T]he incorporation of the Charter 
92 On this self-created mandate, see, supra, section B. I.
93 See Borowski, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Treaty on 
European Union’ (fn. 49), p. 231. See also Craig, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, 
Process, Architecture and Substance’ (fn. 59), p. 164.
94 Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution, 
7th edn (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 329-330 (emphasis in the 
original).
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might require a re-evaluation of the competing rights. No 
longer can it be assumed that the economic freedoms should 
take priority. Rather there should be more genuine balancing 
between the competing interests.’95 Finally, a standard work 
on European Union law states that ‘the Charter will have 
positive effects not least in making the European judiciary 
more confident in developing its own fundamental rights 
jurisprudence and holding the EU institutions to proper 
account.’96 The changes in the balancing will not necessarily 
be drastic; they ought to be, however, noticeable.
cc) More Epistemic Certainty
It was outlined that according to the argument from 
authoritative cognition, there is a great deal of uncertainty 
as to what human rights require in a case at hand.97 This 
counts as an argument on behalf of a legal framework that 
establishes legal certainty by establishing substantive content 
and attributing competences. Legal certainty begins with the 
question of what counts as a human right. Which interest 
of the individual is so important that it deserves particular 
protection? A written bill or rights that records several liber-
ty rights, equality rights and positive rights in quite a few 
provisions gives rise to more epistemic certainty – in other 
words: more clarity – than a reference to general principles 
of Union law. A good illustration of this fact is human dig-
nity. Advocate General Christine Stix-Hackl needed about 
five pages (para 74 to 92) in her opinion in Omega to justify 
that human dignity as a fundamental right counts as a ge-
95 Barnard, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Happy 10th Birthday’ 
(fn. 73), p. 9.
96 Dashwood et al., Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law (fn. 41), p. 387.
97 See, supra, section A. II. 2.
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neral principle of Union law.98 Compare that to the short 
and clear statement in Article 1 ChFR: ‘Human dignity is 
inviolable. It must be respected and protected.’ Since both 
empirical and normative epistemic uncertainty may well 
decrease the weight of rights in balancing according to the 
principle of proportionality,99 more epistemic certainty leads 
to greater weight. This is another aspect for greater weight 
of fundamental rights according to the ChFR, compared to 
fundamental rights of the ‘old layer’.
(dd) Summary
To sum up, the ChFR is for the biggest part a reaffir-
mation of rights that were already granted in the EU before 
the Treaty of Lisbon. The ChFR in its legally binding form 
as a part of written primary Union law, however, generally 
strengthens the protection of the interests of the individual 
by giving the ECJ a clearer and stronger mandate for the 
protection of fundamental rights and by reducing epistemic 
uncertainty as to what counts as a fundamental right. Thus, 
there is reason to assume that the ChFR strengthens the 
protection of fundamental rights in the EU to some extent. 
In that sense and to this extent, the ChFR actually extends 
the power of the courts to find violations of fundamental 
rights. Article 1 (1) PoC, which rules out such an extension 
for Poland and the United Kingdom, proves to be an, albeit 
modest, partial opt-out.
Interestingly, this goes contrary to the finding of the 
ECJ in N.S. In this preliminary reference the Court was asked 
whether the Protocol on the ChFR can be regarded as an 
98 Opinion of General Advocate Stix-Hackl from 18 March 2004, Case C-36/02, 
Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH [2004] ECR I-9611.
99 This is a topic in and of itself. See, for example, Borowski, Grundrechte als 
Prinzipien (fn. 8), pp. 177-190 with further references.
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opt-out. Advocate General Verica Trstenjak stated that the 
Protocol on the Charter cannot be regarded as a general opt-
-out from the ChFR.100 This is correct, but follows trivially 
from the wording. The only other remark with an eye to 
Article 1 (1) PoC was to point out that this provision ‘merely 
reaffirms the normative content of Article 51’ ChFR.101 The 
ECJ referred to these passages in the Advocate General’s 
opinion and held: ‘Protocol No 30 does not call into question 
the applicability of the Charter in the United Kingdom or 
Poland’, with particular reference to the fact that according 
to the sixth recital to the preamble of the ChFR, ‘the Charter 
reaffirms the rights, freedoms and principles recognised in 
the Union and makes those rights more visible, but does 
not create new rights or principles.’102 This led the ECJ to 
the following conclusion: ‘Article 1 (1) of Protocol (No 30) 
explains Article 51 of the Charter with regard to the scope 
thereof and does not intend to exempt the Republic of Poland 
or the United Kingdom from the obligation to comply with 
the provisions of the Charter or to prevent a court of one of 
those Member States from ensuring compliance with those 
provisions.’103 It is quite obvious that the reasoning of the 
Court remains – in kind words – undercomplex. It might 
also be important to point out that the eleventh recital of 
the Preamble of the Protocol, which states that ‘this Proto-
col is without prejudice to the application of the Charter to 
other Member States‘, would be meaningless if it changed 
nothing.104
100 Opinion of Advocate General Verica Trstenjak from 22 September 2011, 
Case C-411/10, NS v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, para 167.
101 Ibid., para 169.
102 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 21 December 2011, N.S. and M.E. [2011] ECR I-13905, para 119.
103 Ibid., para 120.
104  See Anderson and Murphy, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights’ 
VIRTUES AND VICES OF TWO LAYERS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 117 | pp. 363-442 | jul./dez. 2018
414
A German commentator has characterized the appro-
ach of the ECJ in N.S. and M.E. with the expression that the 
Court ‘interpreted away’ (‘weginterpretiert’) the legal effects 
of Article 1 (1) PoC.105 This may be read as hinting at the 
allegation that the Court arrived at its conclusion for poli-
tical rather than legal reasons. At any rate, there are good 
reasons to assume that the ChFR strengthens the protection 
of fundamental rights and that to that extent Article 1 (1) 
PoC may have legal effect – be it modest and, owing to the 
dynamic character of the points of comparison,106 even in its 
modest extent possibly only temporary.
c) A Limitation of the Power of the Courts Only
It deserves to be emphasized that the wording of Ar-
ticle 1 (1) PoC only limits the power of the ECJ and of the 
national courts to review British and Polish national law by 
the yardstick of the ChFR. This is only one aspect of the com-
mitment of the member states to the ChFR.107 According to 
the clear wording of Article 1 (1) PoC, the commitment to the 
ChFR of the branches of government other than the judiciary 
remains unaffected by this provision. This is to say that the 
British and the Polish executive as well as the British and 
the Polish legislature remain fully committed to the ChFR, 
independent of whether the ChFR ‘extends’ the power of 
courts. In so far as these branches of government other than 
the judiciary should fail to respect an aspect that represents 
(fn. 46), pp. 166-167; Arnull, ‘Protocol (No 30)’ (fn. 58), p. 1604; Ziller, ‘Das 
Protokoll Nr. 30’ (fn. 62), p. 104.
105 Wolfgang Weiß, ‘Grundrechtsschutz in der EU: Quo Vadis?, Europäische 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2012, pp. 201-202, at p. 202.
106 See, infra, section C. V. 1. d).
107 See also Ziller, ‘Das Protokoll Nr. 30’ (fn. 62), p. 105 with an eye to the 
legislature.
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an ‘extension’ to which the ChFR gives rise, owing to Article 
1 (1) PoC neither a British or Polish court nor the ECJ can, 
however, establish a violation of the ChFR. Admittedly, it is 
difficult to determine whether an ‘extension’ of the power of 
courts brought about by the ChFR is at stake in a given case 
and the commitment of branches of government other than 
the judiciary is rather theoretical in so far as ‘non-justiciable’ 
aspects are concerned. At any rate, the emphasis on limiting 
the power of courts is telling, because it reveals that the 
Protocol on the ChFR is a particular expression of distrust 
vis-à-vis courts – of distrust, not least of all, vis-à-vis the ECJ.
d) The Dynamic Nature of the Point of Comparison
Finally, the question arises as to whether the point of 
comparison for determining whether and to what extent the 
Charter counts as an ‘extension’, Article 6 (3) TEU (ToL), is 
static or dynamic in nature. The point of comparison is static 
in nature if a point in time is decisive – in the case of Arti-
cle 6 (3) TEU (ToL) the point in time would be 1 December 
2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon became effective. The level 
of protection granted by Article 6 (3) on 1 December 2009 
would count as the point of comparison.
Article 6 (3) TEU (ToL), and the same applied to all 
precursor provisions – Article F (2) TEU (ToM) and Article 
6 (2) TEU (ToA) – is, however, dynamic in nature. Also the 
case law of the ECJ that these provisions confirm has ever had 
dynamic character. What is more, the sources of inspiration, 
to which Article 6 (3) TEU (ToL) refers, are dynamic in nature. 
The constitutional traditions common to the Member States 
evolve over time, and the same applies to the protection 
of human rights granted by the ECHR. In particular, new 
protocols to the ECHR may extend the scope of the protec-
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tion of fundamental rights and also the interpretation of the 
Convention rights by the ECtHR in Strasbourg evolves. This 
dynamic nature of fundamental rights as general principles 
of Community law and later Union law has always been 
part of the acquis communtaire. Nothing in the Protocol on 
the ChFR indicates that this Protocol would affect the acquis 
communitaire with an eye to fundamental rights as general 
principles of Community or Union law.108
Thus, Article 6 (3) TEU (ToL), the point of comparison 
for the determining whether and to which extent the ChFR 
extends the power of courts according to Article 1 (1) PoC, 
is dynamic in nature. To be sure, also the interpretation of 
the provisions of the ChFR will evolve over time. This is to 
say that both points of comparison are dynamic in nature. It 
is difficult to predict precisely with which speed both layers 
of protection will evolve. In general, there will be a tendency 
towards a convergence of both layers to a ‘single standard’ 
of the protection of fundamental rights.109 To the extent that 
such convergence of both layers will have been achieved, 
the ChFR will not grant more protection than Article 6 (3) 
TEU (ToL). If and when this will have been fully achieved, 
the ChFR will not ‘extend’ the power of the courts any more; 
Article 1 (1) PoC will have lost any legal effect.
e) Summary
The Charter ‘extends’ the protection of the rights it 
reaffirms by providing a clear and detailed mandate for the 
protection of fundamental rights in written primary Union 
108 See, for example, Craig, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, Process, Architecture and 
Substance’ (fn. 59), p. 163.
109 On the trend towards convergence, see Borowski, ‘The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the Treaty on European Union’ (fn. 49), p. 219 et 
passim.
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law, which will result in ascribing more weight to these ri-
ghts in the balancing with competing rights and interests. By 
limiting this ‘extension’ in so far as Poland’s and the United 
Kingdom’s commitment to the ChFR is concerned, Article 
1 (1) PoC is technically a partial opt-out from legal effects 
of the Charter.
This opt-out is, however, qualified in two respects. 
To begin with, because the ChFR is for the biggest part a 
reaffirmation of fundamental rights as general principles of 
Community/Union law, it extends the protection of funda-
mental rights by some margin, but may not be immediately 
noticable. The opt-out from such a margin is a rather modest 
opt-out. Second, the tendency towards convergence of rights 
of the ChFR and fundamental rights as general principles 
of Union law will quite likely diminish the relevance of this 
opt-out up to the point at which Article 1 (1) PoC may well 
have lost any legal effect whatsoever.
2 No Justiciable Rights in Title IV of the ChFR, Article 1 
(2) PoC
Is Article 1 (2) PoC also an opt-out? This provision 
states that, ‘for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV 
of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland 
or the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the 
United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national 
law’. This provision reflects the concern of the government 
of the United Kingdom that social and economic rights in 
Title IV of the Charter could be interpreted as an expansion 
of Union competence in labour law, providing a basis for 
judicial activism of the ECJ or domestic courts. To be sure, 
if provisions in Title IV of the ChFR do not grant ‘justiciable 
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rights’ anyway, Article 1 (2) PoC changes nothing.110 Only 
if some of these rights are actually justiciable, Poland111 and 
the United Kingdom had opted out from the ‘justiciability’112 
of these rights by means of Article 1 (2) PoC.
a) Do Provisions in Title IV of the ChFR Grant ‘Justiciable 
Rights’?
The expression ‘for the avoidance of doubt’ in Article 
1 (2) PoC reflects that this provision of the Protocol is an 
attempt to secure an interpretation of all provisions in Title 
IV of the ChFR in conjunction with Article 52 (5) ChFR, 
according to which these provisions do not give rise to ‘jus-
ticiable rights’, legal positions that the holders of the rights 
are empowered to enforce before the courts. This raises 
the question as to whether the provisions in Title IV of the 
ChFR, Article 27 to 38, are ‘principles’ in the sense of Arti-
cle 52 (5) ChFR and whether the nature of such ‘principles’ 
rules out that they give rise to ‘justiciable rights’. To make 
things worse, a comprehensive answer to the first question 
depends on the answer to the second – you can only answer 
the question which provisions give rise to ‘principles’ if you 
have understood the characteristics of ‘principles’.
The United Kingdom had preferred from the outset that 
the ChFR never attained the status of binding law. When this 
110 See, for example, Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, ‘Die Charta 
der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union nach dem Inkrafttreten des 
Vertrages von Lissabon’, Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 2010, pp. 265-
271, at p. 270.
111 Poland’s Declaration No 62 does not count as an ‘opt-out from the opt-out’, 
for a Declaration has not the power to amend a Protocol. See footnote 151 
and the accompanying text.
112 This opt-out would not render provisions in Title IV of the Charter 
inapplicable to Poland and the United Kingdom; it would render these 
provisions ‘non-justiciable’.
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proved impossible, the horizontal provisions, now Art. 52 (4) 
to (7) ChFR, were introduced when the ChFR was included 
in the Constitutional Treaty (as Articles II-112 [4] to [7]).113 
The United Kingdom’s idea was to avoid to empower the 
ECJ to enforce economic and social rights.114 This is why the 
distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘principles’ is particularly 
geared to provisions in Title IV of the ChFR, although Article 
52 (5) ChFR does not explicitly say so.
aa) The ‘Explanations’ – Which Provisions of the ChFR 
Establish ‘Principles’?
With an eye to the question which provisions give 
rise to ‘principles’ rather than ‘rights’, there is some limited 
guidance in the ‘explanations’ on the ChFR. The original 
version of these explanations was ‘prepared at the instigation 
of the Praesidium’ of the Convention of the Charter,115 the 
explanations were not, however, approved by the plenary 
of the Charter Convention.116 In the second sentence of the 
initial version of these ‘explanations’, they characterize 
themselves as having ‘no legal value’. An amended version 
113 On the three versions of the ChFR, see footnote 49.
114 See, for example, Arnull, ‘Protocol (No 30) (fn. 58), p. 1600. Lord Goldsmith 
played an important role in drafting the horizontal provisions, among 
them Article II-112 (5) CT and now Article 52 (5) ChFR. It was later Lord 
Goldsmith who drafted the Protocol on the ChFR, so that there was 
continuity with an eye to the people behind placing in perspective social 
and economic rights by means of (what was later) Article 52 (5) ChFR in 
the Constitutional Treaty and later, in the Treaty of Lisbon, by means of 
Article 1 (2) PoC.
115 Note from the Praesidium of the Convention: Explanations on the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Brussels, 11 October 2000) 
CHARTE 4473/00 CONVENT 49.
116 See Anthony Arnull, ‘From Charter to Constitution and Beyond – 
Fundamental Rights in the New European Union’, Public Law 2003, 
pp. 774-793, at p. 784.
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of the ‘explanations’ was produced in 2007 in Working 
Group II of the European Convention.117 The language of 
their self-characterization changed slightly. The second 
sentence of the amended version of the ‘explanations’ now 
reads: ‘Although they do not have the status of law, they 
are a valuable tool of interpretation intended to clarify the 
provisions of the Charter.’ The language in the amended 
version is somewhat more positive, but the decisive issue is 
the same: The ‘explanations’ do not have the authoritative 
status of binding law. They may become relevant in legal 
interpretation as some form of ‘soft law’, but might well be 
outweighed by competing arguments in legal argumenta-
tion.118 Since this self-characterization forms an integral part 
of the explanations themselves, the parts of the ‘explanations’ 
beyond this self-characterization cannot become legally 
binding by external reference or incorporation by means of 
binding law.119 In substance, these ‘explanations’ attempt to 
classify some provisions of the ChFR as establishing merely 
non-justiciable ‘principles’.120 Things are complicated further 
by clause 7 of the ‘explanations’ on Article 52 (5) ChFR: ‘In 
some cases, an Article of the Charter may contain both ele-
117 CONV 354/02, WG II 16, OJ 2007/C 303/02.
118 See Borowski, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Treaty on 
European Union’ (fn. 49), pp. 208-210.
119 There are actually three provisions in primary EU law that refer to the 
‘explanations’: the second sentence of the fifth recital of the Preamble of 
the ChFR, Article 52 (7) ChFR, and Article 6 (1) clause 3 TEU. Strangely, the 
third recital of the Protocol on the Charter claims that ‘the aforementioned 
Article 6 (1) clause 3 TEU requires the Charter to be applied and interpreted 
by the courts of Poland and of the United Kingdom strictly in accordance 
with the explanations referred to in that Article’. (emphasis added). Article 
6 (1) clause 3 TEU actually does not – it requires only ‘due regard’. This 
nuance is, however, hardly decisive.
120 See, in particular, the ‘explanations’ on Article 34 (1), 35, 36, 37, and 38 
ChFR.
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ments of a right and of a principle.‘ The key characteristic 
is expressed in clause 4: ‘They do not however give rise to 
direct claims for positive action by the Union’s institutions 
or Member States authorities.’
bb) The Characteristics of ‘Principles’ According to Arti-
cle 52 (5) ChFR
There has been much debate on the characteristics of 
‘principles’ according to Article 52 (5) ChFR. The ChFR, 
incorporated by means of Article 6 (1) TEU, has the nature 
of a multilateral international treaty. This is to say that the 
wording is the result of a compromise between and among 
parties with different intent, so that the wording carries 
particular weight in the interpretation (Article 31 [1] of the 
Viennese Convention of the Law of Treaties).121 The wording 
of Article 52 (5) ChFR states: ‘The provisions of this Charter 
which contain principles may be implemented by legislative 
and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when 
they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their res-
pective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the 
interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.’ 
The key word in clause 1 is ‘may’ – there is no legal obligation 
of the addressees of the ChFR to implement a ‘principle’. 
They may or they may not, this is legally indifferent. Clau-
se 2 has two messages, a negative and a positive one. The 
negative message is that a ‘principle’ in and of itself is not 
‘judicially cognisable’, if and when there is no legislative and 
executive act that implements the ‘principle’. The positive 
121 In the case of the supranational European Treaties, this method in 
interpreting treaties in public international law is often supplemented 
with teleological interpretation.
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message is that ‘principles’ are indeed ‘judicially cognisable’, 
if and when there is such a legal act that implements the 
‘principle’, in this case courts are under an obligation (‘shall 
be judicially cognisable’) to use the ‘principle’ as a yardstick 
‘in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their 
legality’. It is not explicitly mentioned, but understood that 
‘rights’ are judicially cognisable independent from whether 
there is an implementing legal act or not.
In the first place, it is important to understand that 
this distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘principles’ does not 
follow any existing model and is, in this sense, completely 
artificial.122
cc) Three Key Characteristics of ‘Justiciable Rights’
To make sense of the completely artificial and unpre-
cedented distinction in Article 52 (5) ChFR, it proves helpful 
to sketch the three key characteristics of what one might call 
‘justiciable rights’. They are recorded in legal norms that 
are binding, these norms grant subjective rights rather than 
establish merely objective norms, and they typically grant 
prima facie-rights that can and must be limited, subject to 
proportionality analysis.
(1) Legally Binding Norms
Legally binding norms are norms the violation of which 
can be established by courts.123 If a violation is established, 
122 A comprehensive and detailed enquiry into this issue goes well beyond 
the scope of this paper. See Borowski, ‘The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in the Treaty on European Union’ (fn. 49), pp. 210-213; see also 
Christopher J. Hilson, ‘Rights and Principles in EU Law: A Distinction 
without Foundation?’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
15 (2008), pp. 193-215.
123 Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien (fn. 8), p. 373; Martin Borowski, Die 
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the court will impose a sanction to enforce the law. The 
argument from effective enforcement124 requires that the 
transformation of human rights as moral rights into law 
result in legally binding norms. Instances of fundamental 
rights recorded in norms that are not legally binding – for 
example, the ChFR from 2000 until the incorporation into pri-
mary Union law with the Treaty of Lisbon, or Programmsätze 
under the Constitution of the German Reich of 1919 (‘Wei-
mar Constitution’)125 – fall short of a full transformation, if 
and when there is a corresponding human right. This is to 
say that a right can lack the character of being ‘judicially 
cognisable’ because the norm that provides for this right is 
not legally binding.
(2) Subjective Rights and Merely Objective Norms
Characteristic of subjective rights is that a binding norm 
establishes a legal position that is beneficial for the holder 
of this position and that the holder of this position has the 
legal power to initiate legal proceedings before the courts 
to enforce his or her subjective right. By contrast, a merely 
objective (binding) norm establishes a legal position, but 
does not grant legal power to the individual to commence 
court proceedings. The merely objective norm may well be 
enforced, however, by officials of the legal system, namely, 
courts or administrative agencies or bodies.126 If ‘judicially 
cognisable’ in Art. 52 (5) ChFR is characterized by the phrase 
Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit des Grundgesetzes (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2006), pp. 219-221 with further references.
124 See, supra, section A. II. 2.
125 See Borowski, Die Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit des Grundgesetzes (fn. 122), 
pp. 45-46 with further references.
126 Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien (fn. 8), pp. 373-380; Borowski, Die 
Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit des Grundgesetzes (fn. 122), pp. 222-227.
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‘They do not however give rise to direct claims for positive 
action by the Union’s institutions or Member States autho-
rities’ in clause 4 of the ‘explanations’, a ‘principle’ is not 
‘judicially cognisable’ if it counts as an objective norm rather 
than a subjective right.
(3) Prima Facie-Rights Rather than Definitive Rights
Finally, constitutional rights or fundamental legal ri-
ghts record prima facie-rights rather than definitive rights.127 
This is to say that, in the case of a negative right or liberty 
right, an interference with the individual’s liberty can be 
justified subject to, not least of all, proportionality analysis.128 
In the case of a positive right, a concretization takes place by 
means of balancing. In the course of this balancing as part of 
proportionality analysis the positive right is balanced with 
competing rights and principles. The result is a concretization 
of all balanced prima facie-rights and goods: the definitive 
positive right.129 In assessing claims stemming from positive 
rights, there is often a great deal of discretion accorded to 
the democratically directly legitimated parliament.130 A claim 
of an individual that the legislature has failed to properly 
implement a positive right requires that such a definitive 
positive right be clearly established by a constitutional 
court by means of balancing, which will be possible only in 
exceptional cases. This means that there is a third potential 
meaning of ‘judicially cognisable’ – a positive right might 
be only ‘judicially cognisable’, if a court can, owing to ex-
127 See, on this distinction, Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien (fn. 8), pp. 97-100 
and 206-228; Borowski, Die Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit des Grundgesetzes 
(fn. 122), pp. 228-241.
128 See, for example, Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien (fn. 8), pp. 305-313.
129 See, for example, Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien (fn. 8), pp. 380-392.
130 Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien (fn. 8), pp. 244-281.
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ceptional circumstances, establish a definitive positive right 
by means of balancing the positive prima facie-right and 
competing rights and goods.
dd) Social and Economic Rights: The German Ex-
perience
Admittedly, positive rights in general and, in particu-
lar, social and economic rights are notoriously difficult with 
an eye to their structure. In Germany, the Weimar consti-
tution boasted of provisions recording social and economic 
rights. That was so ‘modern’ at the time that these provisions 
proved to be a burden of constitutional rights in general – the 
idea that there were binding, subjective and definitive social 
and economic rights that courts could enforce vis-à-vis the 
legislature was so outrageous that, in turn, these provisions 
undermined the very idea of the binding nature of constitu-
tional rights. When the Basic Law was drafted in 1948 and 
1949, the constituent assembly – der Parlamentarische Rat – 
placed much emphasis on an effective guarantee of liberty 
and equality. Before the issue of social and economic rights, 
the structure of which was completely unknown, would – 
again – endanger the whole project of binding and subjective 
constitutional rights, the assembly rather refrained from pro-
viding for social and economic rights. This was not, however, 
a conscious decision that there should be never such rights. 
Against this backdrop, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court finally held in 2010 that there is a definitive social ri-
ght to the substistence level (Existenzminimum), justified by 
reference to human dignity according to Article 1 (1) Basic 
Law and the principle (in the natural sense of this expression) 
of the social state, according to Article 20 (1) Basic Law.131 
131 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222-227).
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This is a subjective right, provided for in a binding consti-
tutional norm, the content of which is established by means 
of balancing competing rights and goods.132
ee) ‘Principles’ According to Article 52 (5) ChFR and the 
Three Distinctions
Various commentators have suggested that ‘principles’ 
according to to Article 52 (5) ChFR are not ‘justiciable rights’ 
because they establish merely objective norms rather than 
subjective rights.133 Clause 4 of the ‘explanations’ on ‘prin-
ciples’ according to Article 52 (5) ChFR may have played a 
role here, since ‘claim right’ and ‘subjective right’ are used 
as synonyms: ‘They do not however give rise to direct claims 
for positive action by the Union’s institutions or Member 
States authorities.’ To be sure, from a structural point of view 
this idea is somewhat astonishing, since the very wording of 
Article 52 (5) clause 2 ChFR clearly expresses that the binding 
nature of the provision in question is limited. By contrast, 
merely objective norms are ‘judicially cognisable’ – courts 
can establish a violation of provisions that establish such an 
objective norm and enforce it.
132 Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien (fn. 8), pp. 432-436 with further 
references.
133 See, for example, Thorsten Kingreen, ‘Art. 52 GRCh’, marginal number 
13-15, in: EUV/AEUV – Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit 
Europäischer Grundrechtecharta, C. Calliess and M. Ruffert (eds), 5th edn 
(Munich: C. H. Beck, 2016), pp. 2964-2985; see also Ziller, ‘Das Protokoll 
Nr. 30’ (fn. 62), p. 105. See also Hans D. Jarass, Charta der Grundrechte der 
Europäischen Union, 2nd edn (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2013) Art. 52 GRCh, 
marginal number 70: ‘Die Grundsätze dürften objektiv-rechtliche Vorgaben 
sein’. More careful, however, in the most recent edition: Hans D. Jarass, 
Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, 3rd edn (Munich: C. H. Beck, 
2016) Art. 52 GRCh, marginal numbers 68-69.
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Clause 1 of Article 52 (5) ChFR expresses, against the 
backdrop of clause 2, that provisions in the ChFR that esta-
blish ‘principles’ are not legally binding norms, if and when 
there is no legal act that implements this ‘principle’. They 
cannot be enforced at all, neither at the initiative of an indi-
vidual (subjective right) not of officials of the legal system 
(merely objective norm).
Clause 2 states that ‘principles’ are actually ‘judicially 
cognisable’, if and when there is a legislative and executive 
act that implements Union law and the ‘principle’. Two diffe-
rent cases are distinguished: the interpretation of implemen-
ting acts and the ruling on the legality of the implementing 
act. The second case raises a great many difficult issues that 
cannot be discussed here, so that the following enquiry will 
be confined to the first case. Let’s assume that there is a le-
gislative act in secondary Union law that implements a ‘prin-
ciple’. The wording permits two different interpretations I1 
and I2. Let’s assume further that I1 realizes the ‘principle’ to 
a greater extent than I2, and that other ‘principles’ or rights 
play no decisive role. Article 52 (5) clause 2 ChFR and the 
‘principle’ require that I1 be chosen over I2. This permits 
two conclusions with an eye to ‘justiciable rights’. The first 
conclusion is that the legislative act in secondary Union law 
may well grant a subjective right itself. If the ‘principle’ is 
‘judicially cognisable’ to the effect that I1 is required, the 
‘principle’ indirectly gives rise to ‘justiciable rights’ at the 
level of secondary Union law. The second conclusion: If the 
‘principle’ that requires that I1 be chosen is ‘judicially cog-
nisable’, it may well count as a subjective right in primary 
Union law that a court actually gives precedence to I1. There 
is nothing in the wording of Article 52 (5) clause 2 ChFR 
that indicates that once a ‘principle’ has actually become 
‘judicially cognisable’ owing to clause 2, it cannot grant a 
subjective, definitive right.
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Even these short structural considerations suggest that 
even ‘principles’ may well give rise to ‘justiciable rights’. 
What is more, many of the provisions in Title IV of the ChFR 
contain the expression ‘right’ (Article 28, 29, 30, 31, 33 (2), 
34 (3) ChFR), which is generally an indication that these 
provisions grant, at least on principle, a ‘right’ rather than a 
‘principle’ according to Art. 52 (5) ChFR. That provisions in 
Title IV of the ChFR may well grant rights is also explicitly 
admitted by the European Union Committee of the House 
of Lords in its Report on the Treaty of Lisbon: ‘Article 52 
(5) read in the light of the Explanations could have led to 
a conclusion that some Title IV “rights”, such as Article 33, 
represent enforceable rights which could be relied upon 
directly before British courts.’134
This is to say that the interpretive claim that ‘nothing 
in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights’ in Article 
1 (2) ChFR certainly reflects what the United Kingdom had 
preferred, but the wording of Article 52 (5) clause 2 ChFR, the 
result of the agreement the United Kingdom could achieve in 
negotiations with the other member states of the EU, cannot 
be reconciled with this interpretation.135
134 HoL – EUC (fn. 72), at para 5.103 (b). See also, for example, Piris, The Lisbon 
Treaty (fn. 63), p. 154, who argues that Articles 27 to 33 ChFR grant ‘rights’ 
and Articles 36 to 38 ChFR establish ‘principles’ in the sense of Article 52 
(5) ChFR.
135 Against this backdrop it strikes one as astonishing that the United Kingdom 
still lays claim that the Protocol’s ‘purpose is to clarify how the Charter 
applies to the EU institutions and across all Member States’ (Her Majesty’s 
Government, ‘Review of the Balance of Competences between the United 
Kingdom and the European Union Fundamental Rights’, marginal number 
3.5 clause 2 [2014]).
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ff) Conclusion
To conclude, there are actually strong arguments on 
behalf of the thesis that provisions in Title IV of the Charter 
grant ‘justiciable rights’ – because some of these provisions 
grant ‘rights’ in the first place and if they only establish 
‘principles’, even these provisions give rise to ‘justiciable 
rights’ by means of clause 2 of Article 52 (5) ChFR. To be sure, 
Article 1 (2) PoC categorically rules out ‘justiciable rights’ in 
Title IV of the Charter in so far as the United Kingdom and 
Poland are concerned. This is to say that Article 1 (2) PoC 
represents a partial opt-out.136
This seems to be even acknowledged by the Opinion of 
General Advocate Verica Trstenjak in N.S. After having brie-
fly explained the background of Art. 1 (2) PoC, she explains 
that the ChFR ‘does not create justiciable rights as between 
private individuals’.137 That is true, but actually irrelevant – 
that is not the contentious issue. She continues: ‘However, 
Article 1 (2) of Protocol No 30 also appears to rule out new 
EU rights and entitlements being derived from Articles 27 
to 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, on which those 
entitled could rely against the United Kingdom or against 
Poland.’138 In other words: It appears to be a partial opt-out. 
Since in N.S. none of the rights in Title IV of the ChFR was 
at stake, she found ‘no need to examine in any greater detail 
136 See also Craig, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, Process, Architecture and Substance’ 
(fn. 59), p. 163 on Art. 1 (2) PoC: ‘substantive limit’; see also Craig, The Lisbon 
Treaty (fn. 59), p. 239; Panos Koutrakos, ‘Does the United Kingdom Have 
a General Opt-Out from the EU Charter of Findamental Rights’, European 
Law Review 39 (2014), pp. 1-2, at p. 2: ‘substantive limit’. See also Barnard, 
‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Happy 10th Birthday’ (fn. 73), 
p. 8.
137 Opinion of Advocate General Verica Trstenjak from 22 September 2011, 
Case C-411/10, NS v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, para 173.
138 Ibid.
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here the question of the precise validity and scope of Article 
1 (2) of Protocol No 30’.139 The Court did not even mention 
this provision in its judgement in N.S. and M.E.
b) Filling the Gap by Means of Article 6 (3) TEU (ToL)
It was already mentioned that the current architectonic 
of the protection of fundamental rights comprises two main 
instruments: the ChFR, according to Article 6 (1) TEU (ToL), 
as the ‘new layer’ of protection, and fundamental rights as 
general principles of Union law, according to Article 6 (3) 
TEU (ToL), as the ‘old layer’ of protection. The question 
arises: To the extent that the partial opt-out in Article 1 (2) 
PoC creates a gap in the effective protection of fundamental 
rights, can the ‘old layer’ of protection fill this gap?
Let us assume that a certain ‘justiciable Charter right’ in 
Title IV, along the lines explained in section a), is paralleled 
by a fundamental right as a general principle of Union law, 
which counts, according to the common traditions of the 
Member States and/or international obligations common 
to the Member States, also as a ‘justiciable right’. According 
to the case law of the ECJ, all member states are committed 
to such ‘justiciable rights’ as general principles of Union 
law, if and when they act in the sphere of Union law.140 This 
applies, according to the principle of uniform application of 
Union law, to every member state, even to Poland and the 
United Kingdom. While this right counts for other member 
states as both a ‘justiciable Charter right’ and a ‘justiciable 
right’ according to Article 6 (3) TEU (ToL), it would still be 
a ‘justiciable right’ according to Art. 6 (3) vis-à-vis the United 
Kingdom and Poland. This is to say that the limiting effect 
139 Ibid., para 174.
140 On this issue, see, supra, footnote 57.
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of Article 1 (2) of the Protocol would be rendered, in some 
sense, pointless.141
The government of the United Kingdom claimed in 
2014 that this is not the case: ‘The Government’s position 
is that the horizontal provisions on the interpretation and 
application of the Charter reflect how the ECJ has develo-
ped general principles of EU law. The rights of the Charter 
therefore have the same meaning and scope as the general 
principles they reaffirm; they are not two distinct groups 
of rights in EU law that are potentially subject to disparate 
interpretations.’142 Plainly, this is wrong. It may echo to some 
extent the insight that the two layers are different attempts to 
transform the very same human rights as moral rights into 
primary Union law.143 Different attempts at transformation 
may well, however, be interpreted differently. What is more, 
it would have been consequent, based on the understanding 
of the United Kingdom’s government, to have the ChFR as 
the only layer of protection of fundamental rights. There 
was a conscious decision, however, to retain the ‘old layer’ 
of protection as a distinct layer in primary Union law.144 
None of the provisions of the Protocol on the Charter men-
141 See also the quotation from Steve Peers in HoL – EUC (fn. 72), at para 
5.94: ‘meaningless’. The Committee agrees to this interpretation: ‘Where 
a Charter right is declared by the Court to constitute a general principle 
which would exist under EU law irrespective of the Charter, any protection 
afforded by the Protocol will fall’, HoL – EUC (fn. 72), at para 5.104.
142 Her Majesty’s Government, ‘Review of the Balance of Competences’ 
(fn. 135), marginal number 3.39.
143 See, supra, section A. II. 1.
144 See Steve Peers, ‘The Opt-Out that Fell to Earth: The British and the Polish 
Protocol Concerning the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, Human Rights 
Law Review 12 (2012), pp. 375-389, at pp. 384-385: ‘A wider scope or impact 
of the general principles as compared to the Charter must be possible in 
principle, otherwise there is no logical reason why a reference to the general 
principles was retained in Article 6 (3) TEU alongside the references to the 
Charter in Article 6 (1).’
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tions either Article 6 (3) TEU (ToL) or fundamental rights as 
general principles of Union law. All three provisions of the 
Protocol refer explicitly to the ChFR, parts thereof, and to 
legal effects of Charter provisions. What is more, the seventh 
recital of the Protocol reads: ‘RECALLING the obligations 
devolving upon Poland and the United Kingdom under the 
Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, and Union law generally.’ In the same 
vein, the twelfth recital: ‘REAFFIRMING that this Protocol 
is without prejudice to other obligations devolving upon 
Poland and the United Kingdom under the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, and Union law generally’. This recalls and reaffirms, 
not least of all, the commitment to fundamental rights as 
general principles of Union law according to Article 6 (3) 
TEU (ToL). Thus, there is nothing in the wording of the 
Protocol that indicates that Article 1 (2) PoC should have the 
power to limit effects to which Article 6 (3) TEU (ToL) gives 
rise. By contrast, the recitals of the Protocol on the Charter 
underscore the selective nature of the Protocol: Only those 
obligations of Poland and the United Kingdom, which the 
three provisions of the Protocol, Article 1 (1), 1 (2), and 2, 
explicitly mention, shall be affected.
Filling the ‘gap’ by means of Article 6 (3) TEU (ToL) 
could count, however, as ‘bypassing’ Article 1 (2) PoC if not 
according to the wording, but according to the spirit of the 
Protocol. In Michael Dougan’s words: It ‘implies treating 
the Protocol in a relatively abrasive manner, and thus at the 
risk of inviting accusations that an important element of the 
political bargain underpinning the TL [Treaty of Lisbon] has 
been blatantly undone by the Court.’145 If the purpose of the 
145 Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’ (fn. 66), 
p. 668. See also Belling, ‘Supranational Fundamental Rights or Primacy 
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Protocol pursued the United Kingdom and by Poland was to 
limit the protection of fundamental rights, and if filling the 
‘gap’ through Article 6 (3) TEU (ToL) renders the limiting 
effect of the Protocol pointless, one could think of an ‘exten-
ded limiting effect’, according to which ‘filling the gap’ by 
fundamental rights as general principles of Union law would 
be barred.146 This is to say that this provision of the Protocol 
would count as a partial opt-out not only from legal effects 
of the Charter, but also as a partial opt-out from legal effects 
of fundamental rights as general principles of Union law, 
Article 6 (3) TEU. This can be, however, hardly convincing.
To begin with, protocols ‘form an integral part’ of pri-
mary Union law, Article 51 TEU (ToL). A protocol is agreed 
among all member states; it is not a unilateral declaration. 
One cannot simply argue that the United Kingdom pursued 
this or that end and that a certain interpretation which might 
seem questionable against this backdrop is, therefore, ruled 
out from the outset. The seventh and the twelfth recital of the 
Protocol (see above) are expressions of the end pursued by 
the other member states, namely, to secure as much uniform 
application of Union law in all Member States as possible147 
and to preserve the acquis communitaire – fundamental rights 
as general principles of Union law – to the greatest extent 
possible. These two important ends pursued by the other 
of Sovereignty?’ (fn. 70), p. 261: ‘[T]he Charter and the Protocol could give 
rise to a restrictive effect in relation to the extensive application of general 
principles of law’.
146 See Barents, ‘The Court of Justice after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (fn. 71), p. 721.
147 The principle of uniform application of Community/Union law lies right 
in the heart of the project of European integration. The ECJ has attached 
great importance to this principle in various contexts. See, for example, 
Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG v. 
Hauptzollamt Itzehoe and Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Paderborn, 
[1991] ECR-I 00415, para 26: The uniform application of Community law 
‘is a fundamental requirement of the Community legal order’.
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member states call for ‘filling the gap’ by means of Article 
6 (3) TEU (ToL).
To all appearances it was the intent of the United 
Kingdom’s Government to see the country and the Union not 
be subjected to ‘justiciable rights’ in Title IV of the Charter. 
If it was also the United Kingdom’s government’s intent 
to limit fundamental rights as general principles of Union 
law to the same extent, this further intent was, considering 
the clear wording of the agreement among all member 
states – not realized. What is more, in so far as the Protocol 
on the Charter was supposed to demonstrate, with an eye 
to internal affairs of the United Kingdom, that the United 
Kingdom’s Government does not transfer sovereign rights to 
the Union by ratifying the Lisbon Treaty,148 filling the gap by 
means of Article 6 (3) TEU (ToL) plays no role anyway. This 
provision expresses only the acquis communitaire, to which 
the United Kingdom was fully committed even before the 
Treaty of Lisbon.
Poland is, however, a different case. The Polish gover-
nment was not concerned about ‘justiciable rights’ in Title IV 
of the Charter. This is clearly expressed in Poland’s unilateral 
declaration on the Protocol on the Charter (No. 62):149 ‘Poland 
declares that, having regard to the tradition of social move-
ment of “Solidarity” and its significant contribution to the 
struggle for social and labour rights, it fully respects social 
and labour rights, as established by European Union law, 
and in particular those reaffirmed in Title IV of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.’150 If ‘fully 
148 See, supra, C. I.
149 See supra, footnote 67.
150 A commentator described this declaration, with an eye to the fact that 
Poland joined the United Kingdom Protocol, which ‘was defensive against 
social rights’, rightly as ‘bizarre’, Andrew Duff, ‘Draft Report on a Proposed 
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respect’ means that the Polish government had no misgi-
vings vis-à-vis ‘justiciable rights’ in Title IV of the Charter, 
this declaration seems to be an ‘opt-out from the opt-out’. 
If Article 1 (2) PoC counts as an opt-out from ‘justiciable 
rights’ in Title IV, Declaration No. 62 seems to establish an 
opt-out from Article 1 (2) PoC. At any rate, Declaration No 62 
formally has no power to derogate from the Protocol on the 
Charter. Article 51 TEU states that ‘Protocols and Annexes 
to the Treaties shall form an integral part thereof’, but this 
does not apply to declarations, which are not legally binding. 
Thus, from the legal point of view, Protocol Article 1 (2) PoC 
still fully applies to Poland.151
To conclude, the Article 1 (2) PoC does not affect the 
protection of fundamental rights as general principles of 
Union law pursuant to Article 6 (3) TEU (ToL). In so far 
as fundamental rights as general principles of Union law 
correspond to ‘principles’ in Title IV of the Charter and are 
regarded ‘justiciable rights’, even Poland and the United 
Kingdom are fully committed to these rights as ‘justiciable 
rights’.152
Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union to the Czech Republic (Article 48 [3] of the Treaty on 
European Union)’, Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the European 
Parliament, 19 October 2011, p. 8.
151 This raises again the question of whether it would have been advisable for 
Poland to negotiate an own protocol. See, supra, footnote 67.
152 See Dashwood et al., Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law (fn. 41), 
p. 387; Craig, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, Process, Architecture and Substance’ 
(fn. 59), p. 163; Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (fn. 59), p. 240; Barnard, ‘The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: Happy 10th Birthday’ (fn. 73), p. 8; Marija 
Zrno, ‘Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union to Poland and the United Kingdom: A Polish 
Perspective’, Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 6 (2010), pp. 293-
323, at pp. 318-321; Arnull, ‘Protocol (No 30)’ (fn. 58), p. 1609; Steve Peers, EU 
Justice and Home Affairs Law, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 106; 
Peers, ‘The Opt-Out that Fell to Earth’ (fn. 144), pp. 384-385; Jan Martin 
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c) Summary
There is much to be said on behalf of the thesis that pro-
visions in Title IV of the ChFR grant justiciable rights. Article 
1 (2) PoC categorically rules out that provisions in Title IV 
of the ChFR give rise to ‘justiciable rights’ vis-à-vis Poland 
and the United Kingdom. Article 1 (2) PoC proves to be a 
partial opt-out. This is, however, placed in perspective by 
the fact that even Poland and the United Kingdom are fully 
committed to corresponding ‘justiciable rights’ as general 
principles of Union law according to Article 6 (3) TEU (ToL).
3. National Law and National Practices, Article 2 PoC
Finally, the question arises of whether the third and last 
provision of the Protocol, Article 2, is also – at least to some 
extent – an opt-out. This provision states: ‘To the extent that 
a provision of the Charter refers to national laws and prac-
tices, it shall only apply to Poland or the United Kingdom 
to the extent that the rights or principles that it contains are 
recognised in the law or practices of Poland or of the United 
Kingdom.’ This depends on whether an interpretation of 
the relevant provisions of the ChFR yields a different result.
a) The Reference to ‘National Laws and Practices’ as a 
Limiting Clause
Quite a few articles of the ChFR refer to national law 
and national practices, namely, Article 9, 10 (2), 14 (3), 16, 27, 
28, 30, 34 (1), (2), and (3), 35 clause 1, and 36 ChFR. On first 
glance, one might think that rights provided for ‘in accor-
Hoffmann and Verena Rudolphi, ‘Die Durchführung des Unionsrechts 
durch die Mitgliedstaaten’, Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 2012, pp. 597-602, at 
p. 601; Haltern, Europarecht (fn. 70), p. 656.
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dance with the national laws governing the exercise of these 
rights’, such as the right to marry and the right to found a 
family in Article 9 ChFR, empower national authorities to 
establish a definition of the scope of the right. This is to say 
that if, for example, national law characterizes ‘marriage’ 
as a union of two persons of opposite sex, the union of two 
persons of the same sex falls not within the scope of the right. 
Denying two persons of the same sex a ‘marriage’ counts 
not, then, as an interference that needs justification. The sta-
tement on same sex marriage in the ‘explanations’ on Article 
9 ChFR goes precisely in this direction. On Article 9 ChFR, 
one reads: ‘This right is thus similar to that afforded by the 
ECHR, its scope may be wider when national legislation so 
provides.’153 This reconstruction is not convincing – neither 
for Article 9 ChFR154 nor for other rights subject to national 
laws and practices governing their exercise generally. It 
153 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Conv 354/02, 
WG II 16, OJ 2007/C 303/02 (emphasis added).
154 There is a crucial difference between Article 12 ECHR and Article 9 ChFR. 
The scope of Article 12 ECHR is limited from the outset to opposite sex 
marriages, which is indicated by the expression ‘Men and women […] have 
the right to marry’ – at least this is the orthodox reading, see Pieter van 
Dijk, ‘The Right to Marry and to Found a Family (Article 12)’, in Theory and 
Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights P. van Dijk, F. van Hoof, 
A. van Rijn, and L. Zwaak (eds), 4th edn (Antwerp and Oxford: Intersentia, 
2006), pp. 841-862; John Wadham et al., Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights 
Act 1998, 5th edn (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 265. By contrast, Article 
9 ChFR simply speaks of the ‘right to marry.’ While same sex marriages do 
not fall within the scope of Article 12 ECHR in the first place, for Article 
9 ChFR they become an issue of ‘national laws governing the exercise’ of 
this right. This clause is – this will be explained in the next paragraph in 
the text – a limiting clause. This is to say that, strictly speaking, depriving 
people of same sex marriages is subject to proportionality analysis. In 
that sense, Article 9 ChFR grants more protection than Article 12 ECHR. 
Article 52 (3) clause 2 ChFR makes clear that this is perfectly possible. One 
hastens to add, however, that the limiting clause ‘subject to national laws 
governing the exercise of this right’ generally calls for light touch review 
only, see footnote 158.
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amounts to the legal power of national authorities – which 
are, according to Art. 51 (1) ChFR, committed to the ChFR – 
to decide whether and to what extent a Charter right grants 
protection. Metaphorically speaking, this is setting the fox 
to mind the geese.
It does not come as a surprise, then, that there is wides-
pread agreement that the corresponding phrase in Article 
12 ECHR – ‘men and women of marriageable age have the 
right to marry and to found a family, according to the natio-
nal laws governing the exercise of this right’ (emphasis added) 
– does not grant national authorities legal power to define 
the scope of Article 12. Rather, ‘national laws governing 
the exercise’ of Article 12 ECHR must not be arbitrary or, in 
other words, disproportionate.155 Proportionality analysis 
is, however, characteristic of limitation.156 This means that a 
clause, according to which a right is provided for subject to 
‘laws governing the exercise’ of this right, represents – from 
the structural point of view – a limiting clause.157 This applies 
also to the rights in the ChFR with such a clause, namely, 
Article 9, 10 (2), 14 (3), 16, 27, 28, 30, 34 (1), (2), and (3), 35 
clause 1, and 36 ChFR.158 The scope of these rights is deter-
155 See, for example, B. Rainey, E. Wicks, and C. Ovey, Jacobs, White & Ovey 
– The European Convention on Human Rights, 6th edn (Oxford University 
Press, 2014), p. 357: Restrictions ‘by national law must be imposed for a 
legitimate purpose, […] and must not go beyond a reasonable limit to attain 
that purpose.’ See also Wadham et al., (fn. 154), at 266-7. 
156 Where proportionality analysis is applied to rights, these rights are be 
limited. On the necessary relation between proportionality and limitation, 
see Martin Borowski, ‘Limiting Clauses’, Legisprudence 1 (2007), pp. 197-240, 
at pp. 203-204; Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien (fn. 8), pp. 206-217.
157 See Borowski, ‘Limiting Clauses’ (fn. 156), pp. 221 and 235.
158 See Borowski, ‘Limiting Clauses’ (fn. 156), pp. 234-236. This raises the 
question of the relation between this special limiting clause and the general 
limiting clause in Article 51 (1) ChFR. On behalf of parallel application of 
this special limiting clause and the general limiting clause in Article 51 (1) 
ChFR, see Steve Peers, ‘Taking Rights Away? Limitations and Derogations’, 
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mined by Union law alone, while national law and national 
practices may set limits to these rights.159
b) Which ‘National Laws and Practices’ Count?
The crucial question in the interpretation of these limi-
ting clauses is, then, which national laws and practices count, 
in so far as the commitment of a member state according to 
Article 51 (1) ChFR is concerned. In other words: With an eye 
to, for example, France’s commitment to Article 9 ChFR, do 
only French laws on marriage count? Or does France have to 
take national laws of other Member States into consideration?
The alternative would be some form of common deno-
minator that results from a complex assessment of the whole 
of the laws on marriage in all member states. The question 
of a common denominator inevitably arises for the Union’s 
commitment to those Charter rights that are limited by na-
tional laws and practices – be it limited by national laws and 
practices alone, namely, Article 9, 10 (2), 14 (3), 35 (1), and 
36 ChFR, or be it limited by both Union law and national law 
and practices, Article 16, 27, 28, 30, and 34 (1) to (3) ChFR.
Which of these two approaches – common denomi-
nator or national law and practices of the relevant Member 
in: The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, S. Peers and A. Ward 
(eds) (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2004), pp. 141-179, at p. 177; 
Borowski, ‘Limiting Clauses’ (fn. 156), pp. 235-236. Critical of such parallel 
application Barnard, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Happy 10th 
Birthday’ (fn. 73), p. 9. The concern is that parallel application of Article 
51 (1) ChFR would leave national authorities too little discretion. This 
concern can be, however, assuaged by ‘a relatively light review of national 
limitations’ in such cases, Peers, ibid.
159 Provisions in the ECHR, in the ChFR, and in some national constitutions 
use the phrase of limits of ‘the exercise of rights’ rather than limits of 
‘rights’. There is, however, no reasonable margin for such a distinction, 
see Borowski, ‘Limiting Clauses’ (fn. 156), p. 214; Borowski, Grundrechte 
als Prinzipien (fn. 8), p. 67.
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State – is convincing? To begin with, the issue of the Union’s 
commitment to the Charter must not be confused with the 
commitment of the member states. The very fact that a com-
mon denominator of national laws and practices may well 
be needed for Union’s commitment to some Charter rights 
is not to say that such a common denominator must also 
relevant for the commitment of the Member States.
Among the horizontal provisions of the ChFR one finds 
Article 52 (6): ‘Full account shall be taken of national laws 
and practices as specified in this Charter.’ Strictly speaking, 
‘full account’ does not decide which national laws and 
practices are decisive. The ‘explanations’ on Article 52 (6) 
ChFR are, however, more telling. They emphasize that this 
provision has to be seen against the backdrop of the ‘spirit 
of subsidiarity’. This is to say that every member state takes 
a sovereign decision (subject to proportionality) as to what 
extent such a Charter right is limited. This makes clear that 
only national law and practices of the relevant member state 
counts, not a common denominator.
This is precisely what Article 2 PoC requires for Poland 
and the United Kingdom. In other words: ‘Article 2 reflects a 
common-sense interpretation of those articles in the Charter 
which refer to national laws an practices.’160 Article 2 PoC 
does not represent an opt-out, not even a partial opt-out.
VI Conclusion
Closer analysis has revealed that two of the three pro-
visions of the Protocol on the Charter are actually partial 
opt-outs in the technical sense, Article 1 (1) and 1 (2). These 
160 HoL – EUC (fn. 72), at para 5.103 lit c. See also Duff, ‘Draft Report on a 
Proposed Protocol’ (fn. 150), marginal number 9.10: ‘It could hardly be 
otherwise’; see furthermore Arnull, ‘Protocol (No 30)’ (fn. 58), p. 1610.
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two partial opt-outs will, however, change relatively little 
in the assessment of claims vis-à-vis Poland or the United 
Kingdom, based on Charter rights. In particular the partial 
opt-out in Article 1 (1) PoC is rather insignificant from the 
outset and will pale into insignificance over time. The partial 
opt-out in Article 1 (2) PoC may have a more pronounced 
legal effect, but general principles of Union law can fill thr 
resulting gap. What is more, Poland does not want this 
opt-out anyway and the United Kingdom will have left the 
European Union on 29 March 2019, the ‘Brexit’ date. Thus, 
from the legal point of view the conclusion is: Much ado 
about very little. The difficulties in the interpretation of the 
Protocol on the Charter are completely out of proportion 
vis-à-vis its minuscule legal effects. At the end of the day, 
the Protocol on the Charter will be recorded in the history 
books as an exercise in political symbolism that created a 
great deal of legal problems.
D. Result
The analysis of the Protocol on the Charter has shown 
that the layer of general principles of Union law proves use-
ful to fill gaps that Article 1 (2) PoC might create. The price 
is, however, that the parallel structure of fundamental rights 
of the EU, the ‘old layer’ and the ‘new layer’, gives rise to a 
great deal of legal uncertainty. What is more, EU fundamen-
tal rights represent only one necessary level161 in the greater 
system of the protection of the legal protection of human 
rights.When these two layers at the third necessary level are 
seen together with the national level and the international 
level, the picture gets far more complicated. There might 
161 On this necessary level of legal instruments for the protection of human 
rights, see, supra, section A. II. 3. c).
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actually be an overlap in the field of application of national 
constitutional rights and supranational rights, leading to to a 
conflict between national courts and the ECJ. What is more, 
once the Union will have acceded to the ECHR,162 the ECtHR 
may well interpret the ECHR differently, compared to the 
ECJ’s interpretation of the ECHR as a ‘source of inspiration’ 
for general principles of Union law according to Article 6 
(3) TEO (ToL), leading to a conflict between the ECtHR in 
Strasbourg and the ECJ in Luxemburg. This suggests that 
it is hardly a lack of legal instruments for the protection 
of human rights or of courts enforcing these legal instru-
ments that represents a problem – it is the plurality of legal 
instruments and of courts which lay claim to authoritative 
decisions, creating a great deal of legal uncertainty. This is 
to say that simpler and clearer structures would improve 
the legal protrection of human rights.
162 See, supra, section B. III.
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